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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the relation between employee whistleblowing allegations 
and firms’ subsequent tax and financial reporting behavior. I draw on economic theory 
to develop expectations for and test firms’ tax and financial reporting responses to 
whistleblowing reports of corporate financial misconduct. I employ a difference-in-
difference research design to test whether firm’s subject to employee whistleblowing 
allegations related to financial misconduct exhibit significantly less misreporting risk 
and tax avoidance in the period following the allegations relative to a control group of 
firms not subject to whistleblowing allegations. 
Using a unique sample of whistleblowing cases obtained from the U.S. 
government, I find that firms subsequently engage in significantly less aggressive 
financial reporting behavior and have significant increases in their effective tax rates 
following whistleblowing allegations. This study contributes to the literature by 
providing evidence on firms’ tax and financial reporting responses to employee 
whistleblowing and by highlighting the role that employees play in both tax and 
financial reporting oversight. In light of regulators’ recently heightened emphasis on 
whistleblower programs, the results of this study should be of interest to regulators, 
researchers, auditors, and investors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In this study, I examine the relation between employee whistleblowing 
allegations related to financial misconduct and firms’ subsequent tax and financial 
reporting behavior. Since the high profile accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and 
Tyco, which cost investors billions of dollars and eroded confidence in published 
financial statements (Hobson et al. 2012), the U.S. Congress and federal regulators have 
instituted ambitious whistleblowing programs to reward and protect employees who 
expose tax and financial reporting misdeeds (Williams et al. 2012).
1
 Regulators’ 
heightened emphasis on these whistleblowing programs is notable in light of concerns 
about external parties’ ability to effectively detect financial misconduct using publicly 
available information (e.g., Dyck et al. 2010; Hobson et al. 2012; PCAOB 2007). Recent 
research suggests that external monitors’ proximity to a firm provides significant 
information benefits that help deter financial misconduct (Ayers et al. 2011; Kedia and 
Rajgopal 2011), which is consistent with the notion that managers are likely to engage in 
misconduct only when it is difficult for investors to detect it (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986). Although employees lack formal authority to impose sanctions against a firm, 
their access to inside information makes them the primary actor in exposing financial 
wrongdoing (Dyck et al. 2010). Despite the significant role employee whistleblowers 
                                                 
1
 In this study, employee whistleblowing refers exclusively to employees alleging misconduct by the firm 
or its agents in financial matters (e.g., financial reporting, tax, securities laws, etc.).  
 2 
 
play in monitoring and uncovering financial misconduct, we have limited evidence on 
how whistleblowing influences firms’ subsequent tax and financial reporting behavior. 
The objectives of this study are twofold. First, I draw on economic theory (e.g., 
Becker 1968) to develop expectations for and test firms’ financial reporting responses to 
employee whistleblowing allegations. Economic models of wrongdoing (e.g., “crime”) 
suggest that when managers perceive a higher likelihood of getting caught, they should 
be less likely to engage in financial reporting misconduct. I argue that by alleging 
financial wrongdoing to a party outside the firm, employee whistleblowing increases the 
probability of future external scrutiny (detection) and thereby increases the expected 
costs of misconduct. However, I also contend that whistleblowing is likely to have little 
effect on firms’ subsequent reporting behavior if whistleblowing allegations are, on 
average, frivolous or if management believes that whistleblowing will not significantly 
influence the expected costs of the misconduct. For example, the SEC receives 
thousands of complaints each month and must use constrained resources to identify, 
investigate, and enforce legitimate cases. Thus, rational managers whose firms are 
engaged in misconduct likely evaluate the likelihood of an SEC investigation, even in 
the presence of a whistleblowing report, and potentially conclude that a given complaint 
is unlikely to considerably increase the expected costs of misconduct. Similarly, capital 
market pressures could influence firms to risk the potential increased scrutiny stemming 
from whistleblowing, especially if managers fear that sudden changes in financial 
reporting behavior might actually attract more scrutiny. In short, consistent with 
 3 
 
economic theory, I expect changes in firms’ financial reporting behavior subsequent to 
whistleblowing will be a function of the changes in the expected costs of the misconduct. 
Second, I examine whether employee whistleblowing is associated with 
subsequent changes in firms’ tax behavior. I argue that whistleblowing activity increases 
the costs of tax avoidance by (1) increasing the scrutiny of the firms’ financial reports 
and the tax positions that affect financial reporting income; (2) increasing external party 
scrutiny (e.g., other regulators, the press) over financial activities generally, which in 
turn can trigger additional scrutiny from tax authorities; or (3) increasing the likelihood 
of scrutiny via tax-related whistleblowing activity.
2
 However, I also note that even if 
whistleblowing increases the likelihood of scrutiny over tax activities, the significant 
uncertainty surrounding the magnitude of explicit or implicit penalties that might be 
levied against the firm for a given tax position suggests that whistleblowing could have 
little effect on firms’ subsequent tax planning behavior. Further, management could 
perceive whistleblowing related to financial reporting to have little effect on the 
expected costs of tax planning. Thus, how whistleblowing affects firms’ subsequent 
financial reporting behavior and firms’ subsequent tax behavior are empirical questions. 
Understanding firms’ financial reporting and tax responses to employee 
whistleblowing allegations is important for at least two reasons. First, recent 
Congressional emphasis on employee whistleblowing programs at both the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) suggests a 
                                                 
2
 Whistleblowers can point external parties to the “soft points” in firms’ tax positions (McCartney 2011), 
which can adversely affect firms’ financial statements and increase firms’ sensitivity to whistleblowing 
generally. 
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heightened reliance on whistleblowing activity to reduce aggressive reporting (IRS 
2012; SEC 2012).
3
 With significant increases in whistleblower activity (Williams et al. 
2012), growing concerns that financial misconduct is on the rise (McCartney 2011), and 
arguments that “organizational complexity is now such that it is extremely difficult to 
uncover fraud without some help from within the company” (Zingales 2004), it is 
important to examine how whistleblowing affects subsequent tax and financial reporting 
behavior in order to better understand the potential effects of whistleblower programs.  
Second, despite explicit whistleblower protection enacted in recent legislation, 
the considerable personal costs to employee whistleblowers in terms of reputation, job 
loss, economic benefits, and future employment (e.g., Call et al. 2012; Dyck et al. 2010) 
likely discourage legitimate whistleblowing efforts. As regulators face an uphill battle in 
securing needed resources to adequately protect investors (McCartney 2011) and as 
external monitors continue to struggle to detect misreporting (Hobson et al. 2012; 
PCAOB 2007), it is beneficial to assess the extent to which whistleblowing complements 
traditional monitoring mechanisms.
4
 Thus, examining firms’ tax and financial reporting 
                                                 
3
 The SEC now promotes whistleblowing as one of “the most powerful weapons in [its…] law 
enforcement arsenal,” arguing that it helps the Commission to “identify possible fraud and other violations 
much earlier than might otherwise have been possible” (SEC 2012). The IRS emphasizes the growing role 
that whistleblowing plays in tax compliance and outlines the agency’s plans for a comprehensive review 
of its Whistleblower Program (IRS 2012). Referring to its recent experience with whistleblower Bradley 
Birkenfeld, whom the IRS awarded $104 Million in connection with the UBS tax scandal, the IRS affirms 
that whistleblowing helps uncover information that it would not otherwise be able to detect (Rosenbaum 
2012; Saunders 2012). Notably, from 2003 through 2010, the IRS awarded over $100 million to 
whistleblowers in connection with nearly $1.5 billion that it collected using whistleblower information 
(IRS 2007, 2010). 
4
 As discussed later, whistleblowing is distinct from other avenues or signals of firm misconduct in several 
ways. For example, whistleblowers’ access to inside information allows them to provide a roadmap (often 
with documentation) to the specific misconduct alleged, outlining a clear enforcement channel to 
regulators. Further, firms typically become privy to concerns of misconduct before it is revealed outside 
 5 
 
responses to employee whistleblowing allegations is useful to regulators as they monitor 
increasingly complex organizations and grapple with growing whistleblowing programs, 
to researchers as they examine firms’ reporting behavior, and to auditors and investors as 
they evaluate firm-level risks and investments. 
To examine my research questions, I use a unique dataset of employee 
whistleblowing cases for the years 2004 through 2007, which were filed with the U.S. 
government because of discrimination complaints associated with whistleblowing 
related to financial wrongdoing.
5
 I use propensity-score matching to assemble a control 
firm sample based on documented determinants of whistleblowing (Bowen et al. 2010). 
Then, using a difference-in-differences research design that controls for time invariant 
differences in whistleblowing (“treatment”) and control firms as well as time trends 
common to both treatment and control firms, I investigate how firms subject to 
whistleblowing allegations subsequently change their financial reporting and tax 
avoidance behavior relative to control firms not subject to such allegations. Using this 
sample mitigates concerns that observed results are related to governance changes 
associated with restatements (Farber et al. 2005) or publicity associated with press 
coverage (Miller 2006).
6
  
                                                                                                                                                
the firm, providing them an opportunity to correct it before external parties become involved. Finally, 
other signals of potential misconduct (e.g., material weaknesses, qualified audit opinions, shareholder 
initiated lawsuits, etc.) suggest the possibility of misconduct well after the fact, whereas whistleblowing 
can provide timely information of what is occurring within the firm at a given time. 
5
 The dataset includes all employee whistleblowing allegations filed because an employee alleges 
discrimination for voicing concerns of financial misconduct. In Section II, I describe the data and detail 
the whistleblowing process. 
6
 Bowen et al. (2010) investigate and find no evidence of subsequent governance changes in firms subject 
to whistleblowing allegations reported to OSHA. In sections 4 and 6, I discuss controls for restatements, 
 6 
 
The results suggest that firms subject to whistleblowing allegations engage in 
significantly less aggressive financial reporting (i.e., exhibit significantly less financial 
misreporting risk, Hobson et al 2012; Price et al. 2011) in the year following the 
allegations relative to matched control firms. I also find that following the allegations, 
firms subject to whistleblowing have significant increases in their three-year current and 
cash effective tax rates. The results of these analyses also suggest that the effect of 
employee whistleblowing on firms’ subsequent financial reporting and tax avoidance 
behavior are economically significant. For example, firms subject to employee 
whistleblowing are associated with up to a .88 (.398) standard deviation decrease 
(increase) in misreporting risk (three-year effective tax rate) in the year following the 
allegations relative to firms not subject to such allegations. In supplemental tests, I find 
that the results are generally robust to alternative model specifications, estimation 
techniques and competing explanations including external monitoring, employee 
incentives, whistleblowing press coverage, and prior year misreporting.  
This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence on firms’ tax and 
financial reporting responses to employee whistleblowing allegations. Extant 
whistleblowing research examines the attributes of firms subject to whistleblowing, the 
stock market reactions to publicized allegations, and governance effects and economic 
consequences (future profitability after and stock market reactions) to such allegations 
(Bowen et al. 2010; Call et al. 2012; Dyck et al. 2010). In contrast, this study examines 
                                                                                                                                                
SEC enforcement actions, shareholder lawsuits related to financial reporting, and press coverage of 
whistleblowing allegations and results of tests suggesting that OSHA whistleblowing allegations which are 
also revealed in the press do not drive the results. 
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the specific tax and financial reporting decisions that flow from whistleblowing 
allegations, which is important given the heightened regulatory emphasis on 
whistleblowing programs. Second, this study highlights the indirect but integral role that 
employees play in tax and financial reporting oversight. While prior research emphasizes 
the role of external monitors on tax and financial reporting (Desai et al. 2007; Francis et 
al. 1999; Hoopes et al. 2012; Kinney et al. 2004; Xie et al. 2003), my results suggest that 
whistleblowing potentially increases management’s perception of the likelihood of 
detection, which deters subsequent reporting misconduct. Third, this study contributes to 
the literature that examines the role of localized monitoring on financial reporting 
discretion (e.g., Ayers et al. 2011; Dyck et al. 2010; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011) by 
highlighting how managerial discretion in financial decisions is directly related to the 
costs of acquiring information about such misconduct. In particular, whistleblowers’ 
access to inside information and ability to communicate information to external parties 
appears to significantly increases the expected costs of firms’ subsequent misconduct. 
Finally, this study contributes to the literature that examines the relation between tax and 
financial reporting behavior (Erickson et al. 2004; Frank et al. 2009; Lennox et al. 2013; 
Robinson et al. 2010) by highlighting how whistleblowing is associated with subsequent 
changes in both tax and financial reporting behavior, consistent with expectations of 
increased scrutiny of financial activities generally.  
The next section provides background on employee whistleblowing, Section 3 
develops the hypotheses, and Section 4 describes the data and research design. Section 5 
reports results, Section 6 discusses additional analyses, and Section 7 concludes. 
 8 
 
2. BACKGROUND: EMPLOYEE WHISTLEBLOWING ALLEGATIONS 
 
2.1 Employee Whistleblowing 
Near and Miceli (1985, 4) define whistleblowing as “disclosure by organization 
members…of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their 
employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action.” Employee 
whistleblowing has received considerable attention from regulators and the media in 
recent years after whistleblowers helped uncover accounting scandals at Enron and 
WorldCom and the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”, U.S. House of Representatives 
2002) prescribed explicit employee whistleblower protections (Bowen et al. 2010). In 
particular, SOX (§806) outlaws retaliation against employees who reveal “questionable 
accounting or auditing matters,” provides discrimination protection for such 
whistleblowers (Title 18 U.S.C., §1514A(a)(1)), and designates the U.S. Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as the agency responsible for handling 
employee whistleblowing discrimination cases. Two more recent Congressional acts (the 
Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, “TRHCA,” (U.S. House of Representatives 
2006) and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, “Dodd-Frank Act” (U.S. House of 
Representatives 2010)) continue to shape the whistleblowing environment for tax and 
financial reporting. Collectively, these acts suggest an increasing regulatory emphasis on 
employee whistleblowing programs.
7
  
                                                 
7
 TRHCA requires the IRS to establish a Whistleblower Office and provides whistleblowing incentives of 
up to 30 percent of the total proceeds (exceeding $2 million) that the IRS collects from misreporting 
 9 
 
2.2 Employee Whistleblowing Data 
Prior research uses two sources to identify firms subject to external employee 
whistleblowing allegations: the media (“press sample,” Bowen et al. 2010; Call et al. 
2012) and OSHA (“OSHA sample,” Bowen et al. 2010). The press sample includes 
firms subject to whistleblowing that is publicized in the press. The OSHA sample 
includes whistleblowing cases that are filed with OSHA because an employee alleges 
firm retaliation (e.g., discrimination) for voicing concerns within the firm that some form 
of financial misconduct had occurred. The whistleblower could also have reported 
similar allegations to another external party. Bowen et al. (2010) use Freedom of 
Information Act requests to obtain information on all OSHA whistleblowing cases 
related to financial practices for the years 2002 through 2004. These allegations typically 
reflect aggressive or (in extreme cases) illegal financial activities (e.g., accounting 
irregularities, tax misreporting, securities law violations, fraud, etc.).
8, 9
 As described in 
                                                                                                                                                
taxpayers. The Dodd Frank Act strengthens whistleblowing protections and provides whistleblowing 
incentives of 10 to 30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected via civil or criminal proceedings against 
wrongdoers. Robert Khuzami, chief of the SEC’s enforcement division, suggests that following the act, the 
SEC has received considerably more whistleblowing tips (about 6 to 7 per day versus the 6 to 7 per year it 
received before the act via applications for whistleblowing remuneration), and notes that some are “of 
particularly high quality” (Patterson and Strasburg 2012). During the sample period of the study, financial 
awards were available to employee whistleblowers for both tax and financial reporting misconduct. OSHA 
whistleblowing cases are not explicitly eligible for financial rewards unless the employee also separately 
provided information to the IRS or SEC. Because employee whistleblowing allegations made to external 
parties other than the media or OSHA are not observable, it is possible that some firms that are subject to 
whistleblowing allegations are treated as non-whistleblower firms in the analyses. This works against 
finding evidence of significant changes in tax and financial reporting behavior relative to non-
whistleblower firms.  
8
 Bowen et al. (2010) note that internal whistleblowing involves individuals reporting potential 
misconduct to others within the firm (e.g., the internal audit department or management), whereas external 
whistleblowing occurs when individuals publicize an internal allegation or reveal information about the 
alleged misconduct outside of the firm. This study focuses on external whistleblowing because cases of 
internal whistleblowing are not typically observed outside the firm (Bowen et al. 2010) and changes in 
subsequent reporting behavior are likely to occur when management knows that employees have reported 
 10 
 
Section 4.1, I use an updated sample of OSHA whistleblowing cases from 2004 through 
2007. 
2.3 The Employee Whistleblowing Process 
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events for employee whistleblowing. The 
process begins when an employee voices concerns (within the firm) about potential 
financial improprieties. The firm can respond by addressing the concerns or perhaps by 
retaliating against the employee. In either case, the employee could decide to report the 
concerns to an outside party (e.g., to the press or other regulators). Further, employees 
who experience firm retaliation (for voicing the concerns) can file discrimination cases 
with OSHA. When OSHA receives a complaint from a whistleblower, it (1) notifies the 
firm of the allegation and provides a copy of the complaint, (2) schedules and conducts 
an investigation, and (3) sends copies of the whistleblowing allegations along with the 
findings of the investigation to other relevant regulators (e.g., to the SEC) (OSHA 2011). 
Regardless of the outcome of the discrimination investigation, OSHA sends the 
allegations to other regulators and retains the right to disclose its findings to the media. 
                                                                                                                                                
allegations of misconduct outside of the firm. Both the press and OSHA samples, which have some small 
overlap, are cases of external whistleblowing. In Sections 4 and 6, I discuss press coverage controls that I 
use in empirical tests and results when using only the OSHA cases. 
9
 The OSHA whistleblowing cases come from each of the 10 OSHA regions nationwide. When a firm is 
subject to more than one allegation in the sample period (e.g., in more than one year), I only use the first 
OSHA whistleblowing case in the sample to prevent repeated “treatments” of the same whistleblowing 
firm. Unfortunately, in many instances, the cases provide little detail on the specific nature of the 
allegations. For more than 50 percent of the cases, the nature of the allegation is not clear either because 
the language used in the detail provided by OSHA is vague (e.g., “fraud” with no description of the type of 
fraud involved—tax, financial reporting, etc.) or not provided by the OSHA office at all. OSHA also 
redacts the name and position of the whistleblower in order to preserve confidentiality. Thus, it is difficult 
to assess how substantive the allegations are (especially in terms of economic magnitudes) or whether they 
involve illegal acts. However all cases reflect discrimination complaints filed with OSHA because the 
employee alleges retaliation by the firm because the employee voiced concerns (within the firm) about 
financial misconduct.  
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Following the allegations, the firm potentially changes its tax and financial reporting 
behavior in response to a perceived increase in the likelihood of future scrutiny; such 
changes are the focus of this study.  
Whistleblowing to OSHA is distinct from other avenues or signals of firm 
misconduct in several ways. For example, in cases of misconduct in which a 
whistleblower is not involved, the firm is unlikely to suspect that regulators are 
increasing scrutiny of the firm until after such regulators have initiated inquiries and/or 
investigations into firm behavior. In most whistleblowing cases (and in all OSHA 
whistleblowing cases), firms become privy to concerns of misconduct before the 
whistleblower relays the information to an external party. Further, whistleblowers’ 
access to inside information allows them to provide a roadmap (often with 
documentation) to the specific misconduct alleged, providing a clear enforcement 
channel to regulators. Without inside information, regulators either need to investigate 
all activities (which is infeasible) or use constrained resources to investigate areas that 
are most likely to involve misconduct (which is likely less efficient than investigating 
whistleblower tips). Finally, other signals of potential misconduct such as material 
weaknesses, qualified audit opinions, shareholder initiated lawsuits, etc. suggest the 
possibility of misconduct well after the fact; however, whistleblowing can provide 
timely information of what is occurring within the firm at a given time. The ability of 
whistleblowers to identify and reveal misconduct in a timely manner is important in light 
of evidence that most serious cases of financial misconduct begin small and snowball 
into large-scale impropriety (Schrand and Zechman 2012). 
 12 
 
2.4 Prior Whistleblowing Literature 
Despite considerable media and regulator interest in whistleblowers, the archival 
whistleblowing literature in accounting and finance is relatively sparse. Bowen et al. 
(2010) examine employee whistleblowing cases and find that firms subject to 
whistleblowing that is revealed in the press experience an immediate negative stock 
market reaction, are subsequently more likely to restate earnings (presumably associated 
with periods before or around the allegation period), and experience more shareholder 
lawsuits and governance changes. They also find that firms subject to public employee 
whistleblowing exhibit relatively weaker future profitability and stock market 
performance. Call et al. (2011) examine the effect of stock option grants on 
whistleblowing activity and find that firms that grant more rank and file stock options 
are less likely to be subject to employee whistleblowing.  
Dyck et al. (2010) examine which monitors (e.g., auditors, analysts, investors, 
short sellers, clients & suppliers, financial market regulators, non-financial market 
regulators, employees, lawyers, or the media) are most successful in uncovering 
financial misdeeds. They find that in their sample of fraud cases from 1996 to 2004, 
employee whistleblowers uncover the greatest number of misreporting cases. In related 
work, Miller (2006) examines the monitoring role of the press and finds that the business 
press helps uncover accounting misconduct, whereas the nonbusiness press tends to 
report on misconduct uncovered by others (e.g., auditors, law firms, or analysts). Finally, 
Baloria et al. (2011) find that firms with relatively weaker internal whistleblowing 
programs were significantly more likely to lobby against the whistleblowing program 
 13 
 
proposed in the Dodd Frank Act. This study extends the whistleblowing literature by 
examining firms’ tax and financial reporting behavior subsequent to whistleblowing. 
 14 
 
3. HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1 Financial Reporting Aggressiveness 
Becker (1968) frames wrongdoing as a function of expected costs and benefits. 
The model suggests that the expected cost of financial misconduct is a function of the 
probability of detection and the expected penalty associated with the detection. Thus, 
deterrence is the underlying mechanism in the model: a higher probability of getting 
caught is associated with a lower likelihood of financial misconduct.  
Because many managerial actions are rarely observed outside the firm, 
management’s ability to perpetrate financial misreporting is contingent on concealing it 
from external parties, who in light of concerns of managerial opportunism (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976), closely monitor firm behavior. Accordingly, a considerable literature 
examines how different external parties mitigate aggressive financial reporting 
behavior.
10
 Still, recent work highlights that with the increasing complexity of firms 
(Zingales 2004), external parties are woefully unsuccessful at identifying financial 
misconduct using publicly available information (e.g., Hobson et al. 2012; PCAOB 
2007). In contrast, Dyck et al. (2010) find that access to inside information is associated 
with a 15 percent higher likelihood of uncovering financial wrongdoing. Their results 
suggest that “while an employee might gain much less than [other market participants] 
                                                 
10
 For example, prior studies suggest that sell-side analysts (Yu 2008), institutional investors (Chung et al. 
2002), auditors (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999), independent and financial-expert board members 
(Klein 2002; Xie et al. 2003), short sellers (Desai et al. 2006), and the SEC (Jennings et al. 2011; Kedia 
and Rajgopal 2011) monitor  aggressive financial reporting behavior. 
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from revealing a fraud, he [or she] also faces a much lower cost (in fact, often no cost) in 
discovering it” (pg. 2214, parentheses as in original).  
In their own right, employees pose little risk to managers engaging in financial 
misreporting: they have no authority to enforce appropriate reporting behavior. Unlike other 
local monitors such as auditors institutional owners, or regulators (Ayers et al. 2011; Becker et 
al. 1998; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011), who have specific mechanisms by which they can impose 
penalties against a firm (e.g., via audit opinions, restatements, market penalties, managerial 
discipline, or regulatory sanctions), whistleblowers’ unique monitoring effectiveness stems from 
their ability to provide information about misconduct to external parties. Indeed, among the set 
of potential monitors, employees have the best access to information and management can 
perpetrate little (if any) financial misconduct without several employees knowing about and 
often supporting it (Dyck et al. 2010).
11
 Thus, although employees cannot impose direct 
penalties against a firm, they can uncover and expose financial misconduct to external parties, 
who can then levy (implicit or explicit) penalties against the firm (e.g., Bowen et al. 2010).
12
  
Notwithstanding the increased probability of external scrutiny, it is unlikely that 
employee whistleblowing allegations will have a significant effect on firms’ subsequent 
                                                 
11
 The significant potential personal costs of whistleblowing likely strengthen the credibility of 
whistleblowing allegations. For example, Dyck et al. (2010, 2216) report that in 82 percent of cases that 
they can identify, the whistleblowers allege that they quit under duress, were fired, or had significantly 
different responsibilities following the allegation. Many indicated, “If I had to do it over again, I 
wouldn’t.” One law firm that provides whistleblower services suggests that the costs of whistleblowing 
potentially include retaliation and/or distancing from one’s former colleagues and friends, personal attacks 
on one’s characters, and needing to change one’s industry and/or career (Dyck et al. 2010). In light of 
these costs, prior research suggests that monetary awards (Bowen et al. 2010; Dyck et al. 2010) or intrinsic 
motivations such as duty (i.e., as a concerned citizen), pre-emptive self-defense or even spite (Gobert and 
Punch 2000) can motivate legitimate whistleblowing efforts. However, frivolous allegations can be used to 
secure protected “whistleblower” status to avoid termination (Schmidt 2005) or be used by employees who 
have an “axe to grind” (Gobert and Punch 2000, 63).  
12
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that in even the most egregious and well-executed accounting scandals, 
employee whistleblowers successfully discover and expose financial improprieties (e.g., Cynthia Cooper 
at WorldCom and Sherron Watkins at Enron). 
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reporting behavior if whistleblowing allegations are, on average, frivolous or if 
management believes that whistleblowing will not significantly increase the expected 
costs of the misconduct.
13
 For example, the SEC receives thousands of complaints each 
month and must use constrained resources to identify, investigate, and enforce legitimate 
cases. Notably, in the 30 years from 1976 to 2006 the SEC only brought 788 
enforcement actions against firms engaged in financial misconduct, which is significant 
when one considers that some 17,000 registrants file quarterly reports with the SEC each 
year. Thus, rational managers whose firms are engaged in misconduct likely evaluate the 
likelihood of an SEC investigation, even in the presence of a whistleblowing report, and 
potentially conclude that a given complaint is unlikely to considerably increase the 
expected costs of misconduct. Similarly, capital market pressures could be such that 
firms are willing to risk the potential increased scrutiny stemming from whistleblowing, 
especially if managers fear that significant changes in financial reporting behavior might 
actually attract more scrutiny. Indeed, Jensen (2005) suggests that managers can 
rationalize financial misconduct despite the considerable potential costs to themselves 
and to shareholders. In short, consistent with economic theory, to the extent that the 
expected benefits of the misconduct exceed the expected costs of such misconduct—
accounting for whistleblowing—firms are unlikely to change their financial reporting 
behavior.  
                                                 
13
 Some evidence suggests that whistleblowing allegations in some contexts can be frivolous (Economist 
2006) or used to secure protected “whistleblower” status to avoid termination (Schmidt 2005). The SEC 
now promotes whistleblowing as one of its most powerful enforcement tools (SEC 2012). Because 
regulators have incentives to promote whistleblowing too both enhance their enforcement efforts and 
justify budget requests, as whistleblower rewards become increasingly publicized, it is likely that that 
whistleblowing activity will become increasingly frivolous as individual seek to secure monetary benefits.  
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Still, I argue that external whistleblowing allegations likely increase management’s 
perceptions of the likelihood of scrutiny by external parties, which significantly increases the 
expected costs of the misconduct. Consistent with economic theory, I expect that in light of the 
significant personal, financial, and reputational costs faced by managers of firms found to have 
engaged in financial misdeeds (Karpoff et al. 2008a,b),
14
 employee whistleblowing allegations 
increase the expected costs of misconduct such that firms become subsequently less aggressive 
in their financial reporting. This leads to the following hypothesis (stated in alternative form):
15
 
H1: In the year following employee whistleblowing allegations, firms are associated 
with less financial reporting aggressiveness relative to firms not subject to such 
allegations. 
 
3.2 Tax Avoidance  
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) extend Becker’s (1968) model to a tax context 
and suggest that tax misreporting should be a function of both the probability of 
detection and the penalties associated with such detection. In this economic model, as 
with financial misreporting, deterrence is the underlying mechanism governing tax 
reporting behavior: as the likelihood of detection increases, the extent of risky tax 
avoidance decreases.
16
  
                                                 
14
 Karpoff et al. (2008a) find that reputational market penalties alone account for several times the market 
value that the firm misleadingly inflates via misreporting. Karpoff et al. (2008b) find that managers of 
firms subject to SEC enforcement actions face considerable reputational and financial penalties including 
termination, future employment restrictions, firm ownership, SEC fines, and criminal jail sentences. 
15
 I make a directional prediction because although there are reasons why one would expect no change in a 
firm’s subsequent reporting behavior (i.e., the expectation under the null hypothesis), it seems unlikely 
that a firm would engage in relatively more financial reporting aggressiveness in consequence of 
whistleblowing allegations. 
16
 Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model tax evasion from an individual taxpayer’s perspective. As Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2010) note, many of the factors in the individual framework also apply in the corporate 
setting. For example, framing the expected costs of detection as a function of the probability of detection 
and penalties upon detection applies to the corporate setting. Because of separation of ownership and 
control, recent work has examined the implications of corporate tax avoidance from an agency perspective 
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 There are three avenues by which whistleblowing can deter subsequent tax 
avoidance: (1) increasing the scrutiny of the firms’ financial reports and the tax positions 
that affect financial reporting income (2) increasing external party scrutiny (e.g., other 
regulators, the press) over financial activities generally, which in turn can trigger 
additional scrutiny from tax authorities, or (3) increasing the likelihood of scrutiny via 
tax-related whistleblowing activity.  
Consistent with evidence of a positive relation between aggressive financial 
reporting and tax avoidance behavior in certain contexts (e.g., Frank et al. 2009; Wilson 
2009; Lennox et al. 2013; Lisowsky 2010), whistleblowing related to financial reporting 
issues could also be associated with changes in tax behavior because increased scrutiny 
of financial reporting information is likely associated with increased scrutiny of tax 
positions that affect financial income. Deloitte (2011) reports that “[a]ccounting for 
income taxes continues to be on the SEC’s agenda when discussing critical matters and 
is one of the top areas of focus in its reviews of public company financial filings” 
(emphasis added). With concerns that tax accruals and deferrals continue to be the single 
largest area of U.S. GAAP failures (e.g., material weaknesses, Deloitte 2011) and a 
significant driver of restatements (Cheffers et al. 2011), external parties including the 
SEC will likely give more scrutiny to tax positions when there are concerns (such as 
whistleblowing allegations) of financial reporting misconduct. 
                                                                                                                                                
(e.g., Slemrod 2004; Chen and Chu 2005; Crocker and Slemrod 2005). Slemrod (2004) suggests that 
managers’ private interests potentially affect corporate tax behavior. To the extent that managers view 
whistleblowing allegations as potentially threatening their employment or reputation, especially if the 
allegations are subsequently validated by regulatory actions (e.g., IRS audit and penalties), they likely 
influence managers’ subsequent tax behavior. 
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Whistleblowing (whether related to taxes or other financial issues) to an outside 
party potentially increases the likelihood of allegations either being publicized (e.g., via 
the press) or reported to other monitors (e.g., IRS, SEC etc.) by employees and/or other 
regulators, which could trigger increased scrutiny from tax authorities.
17
 For example, 
when an employee alleges financial misconduct to an outside party, management does 
not know whether it is an isolated event or signals broad discontent or collusion among 
various employees in the accounting department—the so-called cockroach analogy, 
which suggests that seeing one cockroach likely signals a host of others. The notion that 
whistleblowers can go unnoticed for long periods of time as they collect evidence of 
misconduct (Eaglesham and Siconolfi 2011) only amplifies these concerns. Thus, to the 
extent that employee whistleblowing increases the likelihood of external scrutiny, it 
likely deters subsequent tax misconduct. 
Finally, employee whistleblowing also raises concerns that employees can 
provide regulators with a “road map to the soft points” in uncertain tax positions 
(Williams et al. 2012), which can affect financial reporting income. When Fortune 500 
firms alone account for some $200 billion in uncertain tax positions and few firms are 
free from uncertainties surrounding valuations, economic substance, and/or transfer 
pricing issues (Williams et al. 2012), even firms that are not engaged in explicitly 
aggressive tax activities are likely to be concerned about increased scrutiny over 
financial reports and the tax positions that affect financial reporting income. Law firms 
                                                 
17
 By protocol, OSHA sends copies of whistleblower allegations to relevant regulators (e.g., the SEC) and 
federal law allows the SEC to share whistleblowing information with other regulators (15 U.S.C. 78u-6). 
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seeking business from prospective whistleblower clients fuel this concern. For example, 
Williams et al. (2012) note one law firm advertisement that points potential 
whistleblowers to “details in the tax accrual work papers [which] often make for 
valuable tax whistleblower submissions.”18  
Still, there are also several reasons why whistleblowing could have a limited 
effect on firms’ subsequent tax avoidance. For example, even if whistleblowing 
increases the likelihood of additional scrutiny, there is often significant uncertainty as to 
the magnitude of explicit or implicit penalties that could be levied against a firm for a 
given tax position.
19
 Further, because tax avoidance increases after-tax cash flows, 
management could be less concerned about penalties imposed by investors. Although 
Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) document a small negative stock market reaction to press 
revelations of tax shelter activity, they acknowledge various factors that could be driving 
investors’ responses to that news and Gallemore et al. (2012) find no evidence of 
subsequent changes in tax reporting behavior following such press coverage. Similarly, 
management potentially views whistleblowing related to financial reporting as having 
little effect on the expected costs of a firm’s tax activities, even if such activities can 
affect financial reporting outcomes. Thus, it is not certain that whistleblowing will 
increase management’s expected costs of uncertain tax positions such that they will 
subsequently engage in less tax avoidance. 
                                                 
18
 Because employee whistleblowing allegations likely affect subsequent tax avoidance behavior generally 
(whether due to innate aggressiveness or uncertainty in broad tax planning), I am interested in tax 
avoidance, or the “reduction of explicit taxes” (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, 137) rather than “tax 
aggressiveness” per se.   
19
 Graham and Tucker (2006) highlight that in even extreme cases of tax avoidance (e.g., their sample of 
tax sheltering firms), the final outcome of the tax treatment for a given position can go in favor of the firm. 
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Notwithstanding these arguments, I expect that the whistleblowing likely increases the 
expected costs of tax avoidance such that firms engage in less tax avoidance in the period 
following whistleblowing allegations. Formally stated, I propose the following hypothesis (stated 
in alternative form): 
H2: In the period following employee whistleblowing allegations, firms are 
associated with lower tax avoidance relative to firms not subject to such 
allegations. 
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4. DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.1 Data 
To examine my research questions, I use a sample of firms subject to employee 
whistleblowing allegations filed with OSHA for the years 2004 through 2007.
20
 This 
sample offers three advantages. First, because the OSHA cases are known to the firm, 
but (relative to a press sample) are less likely to be broadly publicized (Bowen et al. 
2010), using this dataset mitigates concerns that observed effects reflect broad publicity 
of the allegations, rather than the employee whistleblowing activity itself. Second, prior 
research investigates and finds no evidence that firms subject to employee 
whistleblowing allegations (reported to OSHA) are associated with subsequent 
governance changes (Bowen et al. 2010), which mitigates concerns that observed results 
in my tests could be due to governance changes that also influence reporting behavior. 
Finally, the OSHA sample reflects both whistleblowing allegations and discrimination 
complaints associated with such allegations, which adds tension to the research question. 
For example, if managers expect that discrimination against employee whistleblowers 
will deter future whistleblowing, they could be less likely to change tax and financial 
                                                 
20
 I use data from 2003 through 2010 (i.e., to match in t-1 and assess firms’ subsequent responses to 
whistleblowing allegations as described below). Financial and short interest data are from Compustat; 
restatement data is from Audit Analytics; institutional ownership data is from Thomson Reuters; 
accounting and fraud risk measures are from Audit Integrity; analyst data is from I/B/E/S; and stock 
market data is from CRSP.  
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reporting behavior out of concern for whistleblowers revealing misconduct in the 
future.
21
  
4.2 Research Method 
I use a difference-in-differences design (Altamuro et al. 2005) to investigate how 
firms’ tax and financial reporting behavior changes subsequent to whistleblowing. The 
difference-in-differences approach mitigates concerns that either time trends in tax and 
financial reporting behavior of similar firms or time-invariant differences between 
whistleblowing and control firms drive the observed results (Roberts and Whited 2012). 
To begin, I follow Bowen et al. (2010) to estimate the following logistic regression 
model, which I use to assemble a propensity-score matched sample of control firms 
based on documented whistleblowing determinants.
22
 
Pr(Whistleblowing)i,t = β0 + β1CM_PRESSUREi,t-1 + β2GROWTHit-1 + β3PAST_PERFit-1 
+ β4REPUTATIONit-1 + β5COMMUNICATIONit-1 + β6DOWNSIZEit-1 + β7QUITAMit-
1 + β8SIZEit-1 + β9ICWit-1 + βjINDUSTRY + ε,      (1) 
                                                 
21
 Because employee whistleblowing allegations made to external parties other than the media or OSHA 
are not observable, it is possible that some firms that are subject to whistleblowing allegations are treated 
as non-whistleblower firms in the analyses. This works against finding evidence consistent with the 
hypotheses. For example, if a whistleblower alleges misconduct directly to another party (e.g., the SEC 
instead of OSHA) and the firm responds by engaging in relatively less financial reporting aggressiveness 
and tax avoidance, then treating such firm as a non-WB firm reduces the power of the tests to detect a 
significant difference in WB firms’ reporting responses to the allegations. 
22
 The propensity-score matching approach mitigates selection concerns associated with the non-
randomness of whistleblowing activity (Bowen et al. 2010). I follow Bowen et al. (2010) to use the 
modified version of their original model in order to maximize the number of observations available for the 
matching process. In Section 6, I discuss analyses I conduct to assess the effect of this design choice on 
the results (e.g., external monitoring tests). I thank Andy Call for providing whistleblowing determinants 
data. 
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Where PR(Whistleblowing) reflects the probability of being subject to a whistleblowing 
allegation and the independent variables (whistleblowing determinants) include 
measures of capital market pressure (CM PRESSURE), growth (GROWTH), past 
performance (PAST_PERF), firm reputation (REPUTATION), unclear communication 
channels (COMMUNICATION), employee downsizing (DOWNSIZE), membership in an 
industry with monetary incentives to report wrongdoing (QUITAM), firm size (SIZE), 
and internal control weaknesses (ICW) (all variables are described in the Appendix and 
are measured consistent with Bowen et al. 2010).
23
 
I match each firm that is subject to whistleblowing allegations filed with OSHA (WB 
firm) to the control firm (non-WB firm) with the nearest propensity to be subject to 
whistleblowing as of the year prior to the whistleblowing event.
24
 WB is coded as 1 for all 
observations of firms subject to whistleblowing allegations at any point in the sample period and 
0 for all control firms, which are never subject to whistleblowing allegations (whether to OSHA 
or as revealed in the press) during the sample period. The time period of interest in all tests is the 
year following the whistleblowing allegation (POST). Notably, the WB firm and its matched 
control firm have the same values for POST in the same years (i.e., POST is an indicator variable 
of 1 for WB firm observations in the year after the whistleblowing allegation; 1 for control firm 
                                                 
23
 Because my interest is in the effect of the external whistleblowing allegations (rather than accusations of 
misconduct voiced within the firm), using the propensity-score matched sample is important because 
control firms matched on documented whistleblowing determinants potentially had internal 
whistleblowing allegations that were resolved within the firm (or were taken directly to the SEC or IRS, 
who likely do not notify the firm of the allegation unless they begin an investigation), while the treatment 
firms are subject to external whistleblowing to OSHA, which promptly notifies the firm of the allegation.  
24 Employees only have 180 days from the date of the alleged discrimination to file discrimination 
complaints related to whistleblowing activity on financial issues covered by SOX (OSHA 2011), which 
mitigates concerns of a significant time gap between the period of the financial misconduct and the 
discrimination file date. 
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observations in the year after the whistleblowing allegation of the matched WB firm; and 0, 
otherwise).
25
    
4.3 Financial Reporting Aggressiveness 
H1 posits a negative association between employee whistleblowing allegations 
and subsequent financial reporting aggressiveness. Although the literature proposes 
various measures of accounting quality (see Dechow et al. 2010 for a review), my 
objective is to assess firms’ aggressive financial reporting behavior subsequent to 
employee whistleblowing allegations. Accordingly, I use three measures that prior 
research documents as being most associated with aggressive financial reporting in the 
form of misreporting risk (i.e., the risk of the financial statements being misstated): (1) 
the mapping of current, past, and present cash flows into accruals (“AQ,” Dechow and 
Dichev 2002 as modified by McNichols 2002); (2) accounting risk (“ACCT RISK,” 
Audit Integrity); and (3) fraud risk (“AGR,” Audit Integrity). ACCT RISK is a 
commercially-developed financial misstatement predictor that is based entirely on 
publically-available financial statement information (Correia 2010; Price et al. 2011) and 
identifies the risk of misreporting primarily from overstated (understated) revenue and 
assets (expenses and liabilities) (Hobson et al. 2012). AGR incorporates both financial 
statement and governance information into a parsimonious misstatement predictor of the 
risk that a firm’s financial statements “are misleading or fraudulent” (Price et al. 2011, 
                                                 
25
 To illustrate, suppose a whistleblowing allegation occurs in 2006 for the WB firm. I match the WB firm 
to the control firm with the closest propensity score based on the Bowen et al. (2010) determinants 
measured in 2005 for both the WB firm and the control firm. WB would be coded as 1 (0) in all years for 
WB (non-WB) firms. POST would be coded as 1 in 2007 for both the WB firm and its control firm and 0 
for both firms in all other years. I require data to match in t-1 for both the WB and control firms, and data 
for the models in years t and t+1.  
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759).
26
 Jones et al. (2008) find that among academic measures of accounting quality, AQ 
has the best predictive ability to detect misreporting. Price et al. (2011) and Correia 
(2010) show that ACCT RISK and AGR perform at least as well as, and often better than, 
other misreporting predictor measures in the literature (including AQ). To test H1, I 
examine the relation between whistleblowing allegations and subsequent financial 
reporting aggressiveness using the following OLS model: 
ΔFIN REPit = β0 + β1WBit + β2POSTit + β3WBit * POSTit +  
βJΔCONTROLSit + εit,                            (2) 
Where ΔFIN REP is the year-over-year change in one of AQ, ACCT RISK, or AGR as 
described above; WB is an indicator of 1 if a firm is subject to employee whistleblowing 
at any time during the sample period and 0, otherwise (β1 reflects time invariant 
differences in ΔFIN REP between WB and non-WB firms); POST is an indicator variable 
of 1 for WB (non-WB) firm observations in the year after the whistleblowing allegation 
(of the matched WB firm) and 0, otherwise (β2 reflects the trend common to both 
treatment and control firms in terms of changes in firms’ misreporting risk); WB*POST 
is the variable of interest (i.e., β3 is the difference-in-differences estimator and reflects 
the effect of employee whistleblowing allegations on firms’ subsequent changes in 
financial reporting aggressiveness relative to control firms not subject to such 
                                                 
26
 Audit Integrity does not use academic measures, market pricing data, or non-publicly available 
information to construct ACCT RISK or AGR (Price et al. 2011). Prior studies using ACCT RISK and/or 
AGR as empirical measures of financial misreporting risk (i.e., financial reporting aggressiveness) include 
Bentley et al. (2012), Charles et al. (2010), Correia (2010), Hobson et al. (2012), McGuire, Omer, and 
Wang (2012), Prawitt et al. (2011), and Price et al. (2011). The appendix provides additional information 
on the measures. 
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allegations); and CONTROLS is a vector of control variables described below and 
defined in the Appendix.
27
 In all regressions, I calculate t-statistics using standard errors 
clustered by firm (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010).
28
 To the extent that whistleblowing 
has no significant effect on subsequent changes in financial misreporting risk, I expect β3 
to be statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
 I control for various factors that are likely to be associated with financial 
reporting aggressiveness and whistleblowing activity. Specifically, prior research 
suggests that press coverage is likely to be associated with larger whistleblowing events 
(Bowen et al. 2010) and documents that use of a Big N auditor (e.g., Behn et al. 2008), 
auditor changes (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998), auditor tenure (Myers et al. 2003), 
operational volatility (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2004), firm size, 
profitability, capital structure, and growth opportunities (Dechow et al. 2010; Price et al. 
2011), tangibility (Francis et al. 2004), capital needs (Dechow et al. 2011), and the 
incidence of losses (Price et al. 2011) are associated with measures of financial reporting 
aggressiveness. Accordingly, I control for whistleblowing press coverage (PRESS), as 
well as changes in use of a Big 4 auditor (ΔBIG 4), the firm’s independent auditor 
(ΔAUDITOR), cash flow and sales volatility (ΔσCFO  and ΔσSALE), firm size (ΔLN MVE), 
profitability (ΔROA), leverage (ΔLEVERAGE), growth opportunities (ΔBTM), intangible 
                                                 
27
 Because the effect of whistleblowing on firms’ subsequent reporting behavior is likely to be most salient 
directly following the whistleblowing activity, I examine the year following the allegation. 
28
 The changes model in equation 2 removes industry and year effects. However, in supplemental analysis 
I find qualitatively similar results (coefficients have same sign and significance) for all tests when I 
include industry and year fixed effects. 
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intensity (ΔINTANG), , capital intensity (ΔCAP INTENSITY), raising capital (ΔRAISE 
CAP), and the incidence of losses (ΔLOSS) in the difference-in-differences model.29  
4.4 Tax Avoidance 
H2 suggests a negative association between employee whistleblowing allegations 
and subsequent tax avoidance. I adapt the Dyreng et al. (2008) long-run effective tax rate 
measure to construct two measures of tax avoidance for my tests: the three-year effective 
tax rate (ETR), which is the sum of current tax expense over the periods t, t+1, and t+2, 
scaled by pre-tax income before special items over the same time periods; and, the three-
year cash effective tax rate (CASH ETR), which is the sum of cash taxes paid over the 
periods t, t+1, and t+2, scaled by the sum of  pre-tax income before special items over 
the same time periods.
30
 Using multi-year measures mitigates concerns of volatile tax 
rates incident to a single time period (Dyreng et al. 2008). ETR (CASH ETR) reflects tax 
avoidance that affects (does not affect) tax accrual accounts. These tax avoidance 
measures reflect the types of information available to and most likely scrutinized by 
external parties. To test H2, I estimate the following OLS model: 
ΔTAX AVOIDit = β0 + β1WBit + β2POSTit + β3WBit * POSTit +  
    βJΔCONTROLSit + εit,      (3) 
                                                 
29
 As discussed later, I also conduct time series tests in which I limit the analysis to firms subject to 
employee whistleblowing allegations. For purposes of these tests, I use levels rather than changes 
variables and include controls for auditor tenure (TENURE) and absence of intangibles (NO INTANG) 
consistent with prior research (Myers et al. 2003 and Francis et al. 2004, respectively). Note that for 
purposes of the difference-in-differences changes model, TENURE drops out of the model (given 
consistent year-over-year changes in auditor tenure) and I include changes in intangibles (ΔINTANG).  
30
 Prior research uses past periods to construct tax avoidance measures (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008). I use 
forward-looking measures because I am interested in how firms’ tax avoidance changes subsequent to 
whistleblowing. 
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Where ΔTAX AVOID is the year-over-year change in one of ETR or CASH ETR as 
described above, WB and POST are defined as above, WB*POST is the variable of 
interest (i.e., β3 is the difference-in-differences estimator and reflects the effect of 
employee whistleblowing allegations on firms’ subsequent changes in tax avoidance 
relative to similar firms not subject to such allegations); and CONTROLS is a vector of 
control variables described below and defined in the Appendix. I control for 
whistleblowing press coverage (PRESS) and follow prior research to control for various 
factors associated with tax avoidance (Dyreng et al. 2010; McGuire et al. 2012; Mills et 
al. 1998; Rego 2003). These include changes in firm size (ΔSIZE), pre-tax profitability 
(ΔROA), leverage (ΔLEVERAGE), foreign operations (ΔFOREIGN INC), capital 
intensity (ΔCAP INTENSITY), use of a Big 4 auditor (ΔBIG 4), research and 
development (ΔR&D), and intangibility (ΔINTANG). Given the potential relation 
between firm-level growth and tax avoidance (Chen et al. 2010), I also control for 
changes in growth opportunities (ΔBTM) and sales growth (SALES GROWTH). Finally, I 
control for changes in cash holdings in the prior year (CASH) and net operating losses 
(ΔNOL). 
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5. RESULTS 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
I present all tables referenced in the manuscript in Appendix B. Table 1, Panel A 
reports the whistleblowing events by year and industry. The panel suggests that the 
whistleblowing events span various industries and occur fairly evenly across years. 
Recall that all of the whistleblowing cases in the study involve whistleblowing 
allegations related to financial misconduct covered under SOX.  
Table 2, Panel A presents summary statistics of the model variables for the 
pooled sample. Tests for differences in means and/or medians reveal that the WB firm 
observations are more likely to use a Big 4 auditor (BIG 4), have longer auditor tenure 
(TENURE), have higher sales volatility (STD SALE), have greater market cap (LN MVE), 
hold more leverage (LEVERAGE), have lower book-to-market ratios (BTM) and are 
more likely to report no intangibles (NO INTANG). They are also larger (SIZE), hold less 
cash (CASH), and pay higher audit fees (LN AUDIT FEES). Table 2, Panels B and C 
present the Pearson correlation coefficients for the financial reporting and tax avoidance 
respectively. The coefficients suggest that WB*POST is negatively (positively) 
associated with measures of financial reporting aggressiveness (three-year effective tax 
rates) although the coefficients are not significant in all cases. I use difference-in-
differences and time series estimation in a multivariate setting to test my hypotheses.  
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5.2 Matching 
 Table 3 presents the covariate balance (i.e., results of tests for differences in 
means, medians, and distributions for matching variables in equation 1) between 
treatment (WB) and control (non-WB) firms, which are matched in the year prior to the 
whistleblowing event. Covariate balance is important in the whistleblowing context 
because it mitigates concerns that observed effects could be driven by differences 
between treatment and control firms that lead to whistleblowing allegations. I do not find 
significant differences in means (t-tests), medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests), or 
distributions (Kolmogorov-Smirnov homogenous distributions tests) between the 
treatment and control firms for any of the matching variables, suggesting that the 
propensity score matching process maintains covariate balance along relevant variable 
dimensions (Tucker 2010).  
5.3 Financial Reporting Risk Results 
Table 4 reports the results of tests of H1, which suggests that in the year 
following employee whistleblowing allegations, firms are associated with decreases in 
financial reporting aggressiveness relative to firms not subject to such allegations. Table 
4, columns 1-3 report the results of the changes difference-in-differences model 
specification (i.e., year-over-year changes in the dependent and independent variables) 
for the full sample period. Columns 4-6 of Table 4 report the results of time series tests, 
which limit the analysis to WB firms to ensure that the results are not an artifact of the 
matching process. Because the time series tests only include WB firms, WB and 
WB*POST are omitted from the model and the variable of interest for these tests is 
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POST. The results indicate that for the analysis using ACCT RISK, the coefficient on 
WB*POST is negative and significant (p-value < 0.05) across the difference-in-
differences and time series model specifications. The results also suggest that for the 
analysis using AGR, the coefficient on WB*POST is negative and significant in both the 
difference-in-differences and time series model specifications (p-value < 0.05). For each 
of the estimated models, the Std Coef. columns report standardized coefficients, which 
reflect the standard deviation change in the dependent variable associated a change from 
0 to 1 (for binary variables) and the standard deviation change in the dependent variable 
for a standard deviation change in the independent variable (for continuous variables). 
The standardized coefficients suggest that the effect of employee whistleblowing on 
subsequent misreporting risk is economically significant. For example, firms subject to 
employee whistleblowing to OSHA are associated with .88 (.48) standard deviation 
decrease in ACCT RISK (AGR) in the year following the allegations relative to firms not 
subject to such allegations. In combination, these results suggest that firms subject to 
whistleblowing allegations are associated with significantly decreases in financial 
misreporting risk in the year following whistleblowing allegations.  
The coefficient on WB*POST is insignificant for AQ in the analyses (p-value > 
0.10). The coefficients on the changes in the control variables suggest that after 
matching on a variety of dimensions, changes in sales and operating volatility (ΔSTD 
CFO and ΔSTD SALE), market cap (ΔLN MVE), leverage (ΔLEVERAGE), intangibility 
(ΔINTANG), raising capital (ΔRAISE CAP), and losses (ΔLOSS) are significant in 
different model specifications. The results in Table 4 are consistent with H1 and with 
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economic theory, which suggests that increases in the perception of the likelihood of 
detection (related to whistleblowing) increase the expected costs of subsequent financial 
misconduct such that firms are associated with decreased financial reporting 
aggressiveness in the year following whistleblowing. 
5.4 Tax Avoidance Results 
Table 5 reports the results of tests of H2, which suggests that in the period 
following employee whistleblowing allegations, firms are associated with decreases in 
tax avoidance relative to firms not subject to such allegations. As in Table 4, I present 
the results of difference-in-differences changes model specifications (columns 1-2) as 
well as time series tests for WB firms (columns 3-4). I find that the coefficient on 
WB*POST is positive and significant (p-value < 0.05) in each of the difference-in-
differences changes and time series model specifications using CASH ETR. I also find 
that for the ETR specifications, the coefficient on WB*POST is positive and significant 
(p-value < 0.05) in the difference-in-differences model and marginally significant (p-
value < 0.10) in the time series model. The standardized coefficients suggest that the 
effect of employee whistleblowing on changes in subsequent tax avoidance are also 
economically significant. For example, firms subject to employee whistleblowing to 
OSHA are associated with .398 (.422) standard deviation increase in ETR (CASH ETR) 
in the year following the allegations relative to firms not subject to such allegations. 
Collectively, these results suggest that firms subject to whistleblowing are associated 
with significantly greater increases in effective tax rates (i.e., decreases in tax avoidance 
behavior) in the period following such allegations. The coefficients on the control 
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variables vary by model specification (e.g., the coefficients on ΔROA, ΔLEVERAGE, 
ΔFOREIGN INCOME ΔBTM, ΔCASH, are significant— p-value < 0.05—in different 
specifications), but are largely insignificant, which is consistent with the treatment and 
control firms being matched on a variety of dimensions associated with tax avoidance 
determinants (e.g., size, firm performance, growth, etc. in equation 1). The results in 
Table 5 are consistent with H2 and with economic theory, which suggests that increases 
in the perception of the likelihood of detection (due to whistleblowing) should increase 
the expected costs of subsequent tax avoidance such that it deters tax avoidance in the 
period following the whistleblowing.  
 35 
 
6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
 I conduct various robustness checks and additional tests to further examine firms’ 
tax and financial reporting responses to employee whistleblowing. Except as noted 
below, the results are qualitatively similar (where qualitatively similar means the 
coefficient on WB*POST is the same sign and p-value < 0.05) in each of the analyses 
discussed below. 
6.1 External Monitoring 
As noted previously, prior studies document evidence that external monitors 
(e.g., analysts, short sellers, institutional investors, auditors, and regulators) mitigate 
some aggressive tax and financial reporting behavior.
31
 Thus, it is important to assess 
how actual external monitoring (versus perceptions of potential increases in future 
external monitoring because of whistleblowing) affects the main results. In untabulated 
tests, I repeat the analyses after controlling for (changes in) institutional ownership, 
analyst coverage, short interest, the probability of IRS audit (using the Transaction 
Research Access Clearinghouse data), and the auditor control variables used in the main 
tests (changes in use of a Big N and changes in a firm’s independent auditor). Because 
firms could be more sensitive to external party scrutiny following periods in which they 
have experienced financial reporting irregularities, I also repeat the analyses after 
controlling for both the external monitors noted above as well as for prior period 
                                                 
31
 See, for example, Becker et al. (1998), Chung et al. (2002), Desai et al. (2006), Francis et al. (1999), 
Hoopes et al. (2012), Jennings et al. (2011), Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), Khurana and Moser (2012), 
Kinney et al. (2004), Xie et al. (2003) and Yu (2008). 
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financial restatements, shareholder lawsuits related to accounting improprieties, and SEC 
enforcement actions. The results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar to those reported 
for the main tests. 
6.2 Accrual Reversals 
Dechow et al. (1996) find that in the year following periods in which firms are 
subject to SEC enforcement (AAERs), firms have lower (discretionary) accruals. They 
attribute this finding to accrual reversals from the misreporting period. Their evidence 
suggests the possibility that the financial reporting findings reflect WB firms having 
abnormally large accruals during the whistleblowing period that reverse in the following 
period. To investigate this possibility, I examine differences in absolute abnormal 
accruals and capital market pressure (CM_PRESSURE) between treatment and control 
firms in t-1 and t (where t is the whistleblowing period) and find no significant 
differences between treatment and control firms in t-1 or t, which mitigates concerns that 
the main results are induced by relatively larger abnormally high accruals in the 
whistleblowing firms simply reversing in the period following the whistleblowing 
allegations (POST). 
6.3 Other Robustness Checks 
To assess the sensitivity of the results to other design selections, I conduct three 
additional analyses (results untabulated). First, Bowen et al. (2010) note differences in 
the nature of and economic consequences to whistleblowing cases revealed in the press 
versus those reported to OSHA. To confirm that the main results are not driven by the 
WB firms whose allegations are also revealed in the press, I repeat my analyses after 
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removing WB firms (and their respective control firms) that are subject to 
whistleblowing press coverage at any point in the sample period and find qualitatively 
similar results.
32
 Second, I assess the effect of option grants on firms’ tax and financial 
reporting responses to whistleblowing allegations. Call et al. (2012) find that stock 
option grants are negatively associated with employee whistleblowing activity. Noting 
that stock options also potentially affect both financial reporting income (post SFAS 
123R) as well as tax liabilities, I repeat my analyses after controlling for stock option 
grants and find qualitatively similar results.
33
 In a final robustness check, I examine the 
sensitivity of the results to the one-to-one matching design used in the main tests. In 
particular, I repeat the analyses after matching each WB firm to the five control firms 
with the nearest propensities to be subject to whistleblowing and generally find 
qualitatively similar results. 
6.4 Placebo Falsification Test 
Difference-in-differences estimation techniques rely on a “parallel trends” 
assumption, which suggests that the average response would have been the same for 
both treatment and control firms absent the treatment (Roberts and Whited 2012). 
Although this assumption is not formally testable, I conduct a placebo or falsification 
test to mitigate concerns that the parallel trends assumption could be violated. To 
conduct the test, I falsely assume that the onset of treatment (whistleblowing) occurs in 
                                                 
32
 The coefficient on WB*POST is marginally significant (p-value < 0.10) for ∆ETR and the p-value is 
.105 for ∆AGR. All other results are consistent with those reported for the main tests. 
33
 The coefficient on WB*POST is marginally significant (p-value < 0.10) for ∆AGR. All other results are 
consistent with those reported for the main tests. 
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the year prior to the match year (i.e., two years before the whistleblowing event year) 
and repeat estimation. I find, as expected, that falsely assuming that the whistleblowing 
event occurs in t-2 (the year prior to the match year) yields insignificant results (p-values 
> 0.10) for all analyses.  
6.5 Investments in Tax Services 
It is likely that employee whistleblowing allegations also affect firms’ future 
investments in tax services to the extent that they increase the threat of future IRS 
scrutiny. On one hand, actual employee whistleblowing reports are likely to increase the 
expected probability of IRS audit, especially given the potential for a whistleblower to 
explicitly identify and reveal “soft spots” in firms’ tax positions. Thus, firms subject to 
whistleblowing potentially invest less in future tax services whose value depends upon 
the outcomes of such scrutiny (e.g., potential tax reversals, penalties, and interest 
assessments). On the other hand, employee whistleblowing potentially encourages 
management to invest in more future tax services to bolster or defend the firm’s previous 
(uncertain) tax positions. Because firms potentially respond to employee whistleblowing 
with either higher or lower investments in tax services, I expect that in the year 
following employee whistleblowing allegations, firms invest in significantly different 
levels of tax services relative to firms not subject to such allegations. 
To examine this possibility, I follow prior research to use tax services fees paid 
to one’s auditor as a proxy for investments in tax services (Lassila et al. 2010; McGuire 
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et al. 2012; Omer et al. 2012).
34
 Because the decision to engage one’s auditor for tax 
services is not random, I follow this prior research to employ a Heckman (1979) two-
step procedure to model the decision to engage one’s auditor for tax services. I first 
estimate the following probit regression (selection model): 
PR(AUDTAX)it = α0 + β1WBit + β2POSTit +β3WBit * POSTit + β4PRESSit +  
β5INST OWNit + β6AUD INDit + β7TENUREit  + β8ΔAUDITORit +  
β9LN AUDIT FEESit + β10BIG 4it + β11MERGERit + β12AQit + βJCONTROLSit + 
βKINDUSTRY + βLYEAR + εit   (4) 
Where AUDTAX is an indicator variable of 1 if a firm engages its auditor for tax services 
and 0, otherwise; CONTROLS is the vector of control variables used in equation 3; and 
all other variables are defined in the Appendix.
35
 I then use the parameter estimates from 
this selection model to construct the inverse Mills Ratio (INVS MILLS), which I include 
in the following OLS regression (outcome model): 
TAX FEESit = α0 + β1WBit + β2POSTit +β3WBit * POSTit + β4PRESSit + β5INST OWNit +  
β6BIG 4it + β7MERGERit + β8AQit + β9-21CONTROLSit + β22INVMILLSit + 
βJINDUSTRY + βKYEAR + εit,   (5)   
Where TAX FEES is fees paid to one’s auditor for tax services, scaled by total sales, WB, 
POST, and INV MILLS (all other variables) are defined above (also see the Appendix), 
                                                 
34
 Consistent with this prior research, I use tax service fees paid to one’s auditor as a proxy for investments 
in tax services because other tax fees paid are typically not observed outside the firm. Since 2003, the SEC 
has required firms to disclose tax service fees paid to their auditor (Omer et al. 2006). 
35
 For the investment in tax services models, I standardize the variables (scale each by its standard 
deviation) for presentation (i.e., unstandardized variables have multiple leading zeroes right of the 
decimal). The results are qualitatively similar (coefficient on WB*POST is negative and significant, p < 
0.05) using unstandardized variables.   
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CONTROLS is a vector of control variables as used in equation 3, and WB*POST is the 
variable of interest.
36
  
Table 6 displays the results of the selection model (probit model in equation 4) of 
a firm’s decision to engage its auditor for tax services.37 Consistent with Lassila et al. 
(2010) and McGuire et al. (2012), I find that the model has relatively good fit, which 
suggests that equation 4 adequately models the average sample firm’s decision to engage 
its independent auditor for tax services. As discussed previously, this is important given 
the non-randomness of firms selecting their auditor to provide tax services. Model fit 
tests indicate the area under the ROC curve is 0.833, suggesting that the model has good 
discriminatory power (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000), and the Pseudo R-squared is 
0.271. I also conduct a Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test and find that I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of good model fit (p-value = 0.162).  
Tables 7 reports the results of the outcome model (OLS model in equation 5) for 
the investments in tax services test. I find that the coefficient on WB*POST is negative 
and significant (p-value < 0.05), suggesting that firms subject to whistleblowing 
allegations are associated with significantly lower tax service fees in the period 
following such allegations relative to control firms not subject to whistleblowing. This is 
consistent with employee whistleblowing potentially increasing the expected costs of tax 
                                                 
36
 To estimate the outcome model, prior research only retains observations that engage their auditor for tax 
services (McGuire et al. 2012). Accordingly, I require that WB firms and their control firms  engage their 
auditor for tax services in both t and t+1, where t is the year of the WB event, in order to be included in 
Equation 5.  
37
 For purposes of this analysis, I use Fama and French 12 industry classifications for industry fixed effects 
due to lack of variation in the dependent variable (AUDTAX) within finer classifications (e.g., two-digit 
SIC code). 
 41 
 
avoidance activities in light of perceptions of increased scrutiny of the firm’s tax 
positions. I also find that the coefficients on ROA and FOREIGN INC (SALES 
GROWTH) are positive (negative) and significant (p-value < 0.05).
38
  
6.6 Geographic Location of OSHA Office 
The OSHA whistleblowing cases are reported to one of 10 OSHA offices. To the 
extent that geographic location is correlated with both whistleblowing allegations and 
changes in firms’ tax and financial reporting behavior following employee 
whistleblowing, it is important to control for geographic location in the analyses. Due to 
the limited number of whistleblowing cases, it is important to not impose undue 
matching criteria that can eliminate treatment (whistleblowing firms) based on common 
support (Tucker 2010) restrictions, which remove treatment firms that manifest a higher 
(lower) propensity to be subject to whistleblowing allegations than any of the potential 
match firms in the sample. Thus, for the primary tests, in order to maximize the potential 
number of nearest match firms, I do not require the treatment and control firms to be in 
the same OSHA region. I believe this to be the most appropriate approach because (1) 
although the offices are distinct, the OSHA regional offices are under a single national 
authority; (2) a whistleblower is able to report allegations to the national office or any 
OSHA office and (3) the OSHA regional offices each report the information related to 
the whistleblower’s complain to the pertinent regulator (e.g., directly to the SEC, which 
                                                 
38
 Consistent with Lennox et al. (2012), as an additional analysis (untabulated), I exclude the estimate of 
the selection bias parameter (INV MILLS) to ensure that the results are not an artifact of the Heckman 
(1979) procedure. I find qualitatively similar results (the coefficient on WB*POST is the same sign and p-
value < 0.05). In untabulated tests, I examine changes in tax service fees paid and find that the coefficient 
on WB*POST is negative, but weaker (p-value = 0.241), which is likely a result of a less powerful test 
given the smaller sample (i.e., about 20 percent smaller) used in the changes test. 
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is a primary mechanisms through which one would expect a potential change in the 
firms’ tax and financial reporting behavior following the employee whistleblowing). 
However, to examine the effect of how controlling for particular geographic locations 
affects the results, I include state fixed effects in the time series analyses (i.e., which are 
limited to the whistleblower firms). After controlling for geographic location of 
whistleblowing, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the primary 
analyses. 
6.7 Persistence of Whistleblowing Effect 
For the primary analyses, I argue the effect of whistleblowing on firms’ 
subsequent reporting behavior is likely to be most salient directly following the 
whistleblowing activity. I expect that the deterrent effect of whistleblowing allegations is 
directly related to the proximity of the allegation itself; that is, I expect that the deterrent 
effect of a whistleblowing allegation weakens with time (i.e., since the allegation was 
reported). To examine this possibility further, I examine the effect of whistleblowing 
allegations on firms’ financial reporting behavior two and three years following the 
whistleblowing event.
39
 I find no consistent evidence that firms subject to employee 
whistleblowing allegations have significantly different misreporting risk relative to 
control firms not subject to such allegations, which suggests that deterrent effects of 
whistleblowing are significantly related to the recentness of the allegations.  
 
                                                 
39
 The use of three-year forward looking effective tax rates does not provide sufficient data in the t+2 and 
t+3 periods to conduct meaningful tax avoidance tests.  
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6.8 Manager Turnover and Changes in Tax and Financial Reporting Behavior 
Prior research suggests that individual managers significantly influence firm-
level behaviors (Bamber et al. 2010; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Dyreng et al. 2010; Ge 
et al. 2011). Thus, to the extent that employee whistleblowing is associated both with 
management turnover (which seems plausible), observed results could potentially be a 
function of changes in management, who in turn alter financial and tax reporting 
behavior. To investigate the effect of CEO turnover on the results, I construct a CEO 
turnover indicator variable using data from Execucomp. Consistent with the other tests, 
my focus for this variable is on whether there is CEO turnover in the event year 
(whistleblowing year for treatment firms and pseudo event year for control firms) or the 
year following the (pseudo) event year. After controlling for CEO turnover in these 
years, I find that the results are qualitatively similar to the results reported in the paper 
(i.e., same sign and significant at p-value < 0.05), suggesting that the primary results are 
robust to managerial turnover as an alternative explanation for the changes in tax and 
financial reporting behavior following employee whistleblowing.  
6.9 Single Changes Difference-in-differences Model 
 The primary analyses in the study use change specifications to examine whether 
changes in tax and financial reporting behavior are significantly different in the year 
following whistleblowing. An alternative approach is to limit the analysis to changes 
from time t to t+1, where t is the (pseudo) whistleblowing year. To assess the robustness 
of the results to this alternative approach, I repeat the analyses using only the 
observations for changes from t to t+1 and find that the results are qualitatively similar to 
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those reported for the primary tests (Table 8 presents the results of the financial 
reporting analysis).
40
 The tax avoidance model does not appropriately reflect the 
response (i.e., the adjusted R-squared for ΔCASH ETR is negative, suggesting concerns 
with the model). Thus, I tabulate only the financial reporting results for this analysis.   
                                                 
40
 The coefficients for ΔAGR and ΔETR are slightly weaker (p-values =  0.082 and 0.172, respectively) for 
this test.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
 Recent Congressional actions have increased the regulatory emphasis on 
employee whistleblowing programs at both the SEC (SEC 2012) and the IRS (IRS 
2012). Although considerable literature examines the role of external parties in revealing 
financial misconduct, high profile accounting scandals have raised concerns about 
external parties’ ability to effectively detect financial misconduct (Hobson 2012; 
PCAOB 2007; Zingales 2004). Although whistleblowing likely enables employees to be 
effective monitors, we have limited evidence on how whistleblowing influences firms’ 
subsequent tax and financial reporting behavior. I draw on economic theory (e.g., 
Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Becker 1968) to develop expectations for and test firms’ 
tax and financial reporting responses to employee whistleblowing allegations. 
Using a unique dataset of employee whistleblowing allegations obtained from the 
U.S. government via Freedom of Information Act requests, I find that firms subject to 
whistleblowing engage in significantly less aggressive financial reporting in the year 
following whistleblowing allegations relative to matched control firms. I also find that 
firms subject to employee whistleblowing have significant increases in their three-year 
current and cash effective tax rates in the year following the whistleblowing. 
Supplemental tests examining the effects of external monitoring; restatements, 
shareholder lawsuits, and SEC enforcement actions; option grants; whistleblowing press 
coverage; and falsification tests corroborate the main results.  
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This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence on firms’ tax and 
financial reporting responses to employee whistleblowing allegations. The 
whistleblowing literature provides evidence of employees’ ability to uncover financial 
misconduct, the characteristics of firms subject to whistleblowing, and the governance 
and economic consequences to such allegations (Bowen et al. 2010; Call et al. 2012; 
Dyck et al. 2010). This study extends the literature by examining firms’ tax and financial 
reporting decisions subsequent to such allegations. In addition, while prior research 
examines the role of external monitors on tax and financial reporting (e.g., Becker et al. 
1998; Chung et al. 2002; Hoopes et al. 2012; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011), the results of 
this study highlight the indirect but important role that employees play in tax and 
financial reporting oversight via whistleblowing allegations. This study contributes to 
the literature that examines the role of localized monitoring on financial reporting 
discretion (e.g., Ayers et al. 2011; Dyck et al. 2010; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011) by 
highlighting how whistleblowers’ access to inside information and ability to 
communicate information to external parties appears to significantly increases the 
expected costs of firms’ subsequent misconduct. Finally, this study contributes to the 
literature that examines the relation between the tax and financial reporting behavior 
(Erickson et al. 2004; Frank et al. 2009; Lennox et al. 2013; Lisowsky 2010; Wilson 
2009) by highlighting how whistleblowing is associated with subsequent changes in both 
tax and financial reporting behavior, consistent with perceptions of increased scrutiny of 
financial activities generally.  
 47 
 
The inferences of this study are subject to some important limitations. The 
OSHA whistleblowing cases provide a unique setting in which to examine the effect of 
whistleblowing allegations on firms’ subsequent tax and financial reporting behavior. 
However, because they relate to discrimination complaints associated with previously 
internal allegations of financial misconduct, it is possible that they reflect only the most 
egregious offenders, which are most likely to change their behavior. Further, the distinct 
nature of the OSHA cases is such that it is possible that such effects do not generalize to 
all whistleblowing settings. With these caveats in mind, I look forward to future research 
that examines other consequences of whistleblowing activity such as the effect of 
broadly-publicized whistleblower awards and the growing regulatory emphasis on 
whistleblower programs. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Variable Descriptions 
Dependent Variables (Accounting Risk, Tax Avoidance, and Investments in Tax Services Measures) 
ACCT RISK =Accounting Risk. ACCT RISK is an ex ante predictor measure of the risk that a firm's financial statements 
are misreported in a given period and is based on financial statement information (including footnotes). It 
ranges from 0 to 100, higher values reflecting greater accounting risk. Commercial vendor Audit Integrity, 
LLC, provides the measure. The inputs of measure do not include market pricing data or any academic 
measure and come from exclusively from publically available information. Audit Integrity examines 
expense and revenue recognition, high-risk events and asset and liability valuation in the context of changes 
from prior years, deviations from industry norms and volatility to construct the measure.  
AGR =Fraud Risk. AGR is an ex ante predictor measure of the risk that a firm's financial statements "are 
misleading or fraudulent" in a given period and is based on financial statement and governance information 
(Price et al. 2011, 759). It ranges from 0 to 100, higher values reflecting greater misstatement risk. 
Commercial vendor Audit Integrity, LLC, provides the measure. The inputs of measure do not include 
market pricing data or any academic measure and come from publically available information and Audit 
Integrity examines expense and revenue recognition, high-risk events, governance, and asset and liability 
valuation in the context of changes from prior years, deviations from industry norms and volatility to 
construct the measure.  
ETR = a three-year forward measure (i.e., measured at t+1, t+2, and t+3) reflecting aggregate worldwide current 
tax expense (total tax expense (txt) less deferred tax expense (txdi)) for the period, scaled by aggregate  pre-
tax income (pi) before special items (spi) for the period. ETR is winsorized at [0,1] and observations with 
negative denominators are excluded from the analyses. 
CASH ETR = a three-year forward measure (i.e., measured at t+1, t+2, and t+3) reflecting aggregate cash taxes paid 
(txpd) for the period, scaled by aggregate  pre-tax income (pi) before special items (spi) for the period. 
CASH ETR is winsorized at [0,1] and observations with negative denominators are excluded from the 
analyses. 
AUDTAX = 1 if a firm engages its independent auditor for tax services in a given year and 0, otherwise. 
TAX FEES = total tax service fees paid to an auditor (from Audit Analytics), scaled by total sales.  
  
Whistle-blowing Activity Variables 
WB = 1 if firm is subject to whistleblowing allegations as reported to OSHA at any point from 2003-2010 and 0, 
otherwise. 
POST = 1 for the period following the whistleblowing allegation (for whistleblowing firms); 1 for the period 
following the whistleblowing allegation of the matched whistleblower firm (for matched control firms); and 
0, otherwise. 
WB*POST = an interaction term between WB and POST. 
PRESS = 1 if a whistle-blowing activity for the firm is covered in the press during the sample period, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 Control Variables 
SIZE = the natural log of total assets (at). 
ROA = pre-tax income (pi), scaled by assets at the beginning of the year (at). 
LEVERAGE = long-term debt (dltt) plus current portion of long-term debt (dlc), scaled by total assets (at). 
  
FOREIGN INC = 1 if a firm reports non-missing and non-zero pre-tax foreign income for the year, and 0 otherwise. 
CAP INTENSITY = net PP&E (ppent), scaled by total assets (at). 
RD = research and development expense (xrd, set to 0 if missing), scaled by sales (sale).  
INTANG = intangible assets (intan, set to 0 if missing), scaled by total assets (at). 
BTM = book equity (ceq) divided by market value of equity (prcc_f * csho). 
SALES GROWTH = year over year percentage change in sales (sale). 
NOL = 1 if a firm has a net operating loss (tlcf) in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
ΔNOL  = the change in net operating loss (tlcf) from the prior year, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
year (at). 
CASH = cash/cash equivalents in the prior year (che), scaled by assets in the prior year (at). 
INST OWN = percentage of shares held by institutions at the beginning of the year (data obtained from Thomson 
Reuters). I set missing values to 0. 
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Variable Descriptions: Continued 
  
TENURE = natural log of the number of years for which firm has engaged its independent auditor. 
ΔAUDITOR = an indicator variable of 1 if a firm changes its auditor in a particular year and 0 otherwise. Initial years in 
Compustat are not treated as an auditor change. 
LN AUDIT FEES = natural log of total audit fees (from Audit Analytics). 
BIG 4 = 1 if a firm engages a Big 4 auditor for its independent audit and 0, otherwise. 
AUD IND = (non-audit fees less tax fees), divided by total audit fees (Lassila et al. 2010). 
MERGER = 1 if a firm engages in a merger in given year (per Compustat footnotes); 0, otherwise. 
AQ = accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002 as modified by McNichols 2002), calculated cross-sectionally 
by industry (Jones et al. 2008) and requiring at least 10 observations per industry in each year. 
σCFO =standard deviation of [cash flow from operations (oancf), scaled by assets (at)] over the prior three years. 
σSALE =standard deviation of [sales (sale), scaled by assets (at)] over the prior three years. 
LN MVE = natural log of the market value of equity (prcc_f * csho). 
NO INTANG = 1 if a firm has no research and development (xrd, set to 0 if missing) or advertising expense (xad, set to 0 
if missing) for the period and 0, otherwise. 
RAISE CAP = 1 if a firm issues stock or long term debt in the given year and 0, otherwise. 
LOSS = 1 if a firm's income before extraordinary items (ib) is negative in any of the current or prior two years and 
0, otherwise. 
Matching Variables 
CM_PRESSURE  = following Bowen et al. (2010), the average scaled rank of need to access capital (Dechow et al. 1996), 
merger and acquisition activity, and potential earnings management measured as absolute discretionary 
accruals using a performance and operating cash-flow-adjusted modified Jones (1991) model. 
GROWTH  = following Bowen et al. (2010), the scaled rank of sales growth over the prior three years. 
PAST_PERF  = following Bowen et al. (2010), the scaled rank of stock returns over the prior year. 
REPUTATION  = following Bowen et al. (2010), an indicator of 1 if the firm is listed as either a "Most Admired" firm or a 
"Best Place to Work For" by Fortune magazine in any of the five prior years and 0, otherwise. 
COMMUNICATION = following Bowen et al. (2010), the average scaled rank of age (reverse signed) and prior year Herfindahl-
Hirschman indices for industry concentration and geographic concentration (Bushman et al. 2004). 
DOWNSIZE  = following Bowen et al. (2010), the scaled rank of average employee growth over the prior three years. 
QUITAM = following Bowen et al. (2010), an indicator of 1 if the firm is in the healthcare industry (2-digit SIC code 
= 80) or appeared on the "100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards" 
list in any of the prior three years, and 0 otherwise. 
SIZE = following Bowen et al. (2010), the scaled rank of total sales revenue in the prior year. 
ICW = following Bowen et al. (2010), the scaled rank of fitted values of internal control weaknesses (Doyle et al. 
2007). 
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Figure 1: Sequence of Employee Whistleblowing Activities and Firm-level Responses 
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Figure 1: Continued 
Figure 1: Illustrates the sequence of employee whistleblowing (WB) events progressing 
from internal WB activities to external WB allegations to firms’ subsequent tax and 
financial reporting responses to such allegations. 
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Table 1  
Sample of Whistleblowing Allegations 
Panel A: Whistleblowing allegations by year and industry 
Industry Description 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
1000-1999 Mining, Building 1 0 1 1 3 
2000-2999 Construction 1 2 5 3 11 
3000-3999 Manufacturing 2 8 3 2 15 
4000-4899 Transportation & Communication 1 1 0 0 2 
5000-5999 Wholesale, Retail 2 3 2 3 10 
7000-7999 Hotels, Services 1 1 4 2 8 
8000-8999 Services 1 2 1 0 4 
9000-9999 International, Non-operating 0 1 0 0 1 
  
9 18 16 11 54 
Note: Although all whistleblowing allegations used in this study relate to financial 
misconduct covered under SOX, several OSHA regions did not provide sufficient 
information to identify the specific type of allegation involved (e.g., financial versus tax 
fraud, financial reporting irregularity, tax misreporting, earnings management, etc.). 
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Table 2 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
WB-Firms Control (non-WB) Firms 
 
 
(Firm-year obs = 271) (Firm-year obs= 271) 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Models 
AQ (0.02) (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) (0.01) 0.06 a, c 
ACCT RISK 51.92 55.00 25.10 50.96 51.00 24.68 a 
AGR 58.46 62.00 24.75 50.23 50.50 24.82 a 
ETR 0.31 0.28 0.17 0.29 0.29 0.16 b 
CASH ETR 0.29 0.26 0.19 0.28 0.26 0.17 b 
TAX FEES 0.53 0.28 0.75 0.74 0.17 1.11 d 
POST 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.19 0.00 0.39 a,b,c,d 
PRESS 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 a,b,c,d 
BIG 4 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.98 1.00 0.13 a,b,c,d 
ΔAUDITOR 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.18 a,c,d 
TENURE 2.51 2.83 0.88 2.24 2.30 0.99 a,c,d 
STD CFO 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 a 
STD SALE 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.13 a 
LN MVE 8.78 8.80 1.79 8.24 8.18 1.33 a 
ROA 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 a,b,c,d 
LEVERAGE 0.25 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.13 a,b,c,d 
BTM 0.40 0.33 0.28 0.45 0.37 0.28 a,b,c,d 
INTANG 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.18 a,b,c,d 
NO INTANG 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.20 0.00 0.40 a 
CAP INTENSITY 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.24 0.18 0.17 a,b,c,d 
RAISE CAP 0.98 1.00 0.15 0.94 1.00 0.24 a 
LOSS 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.19 0.00 0.39 a 
SIZE 8.69 8.75 1.55 8.16 8.13 1.18 b,c,d 
FOREIGN INC 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.65 1.00 0.48 b,c,d 
CASH 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.16 b,c,d 
NOL 0.68 1.00 0.47 0.67 1.00 0.47 b,c,d 
ΔNOL 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 b,c,d 
RD 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.05 b,c,d 
SALES GROWTH 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.14 b,c,d 
INST OWN 0.69 0.75 0.28 0.71 0.77 0.27 c 
LN AUDIT FEES 1.35 1.32 1.05 0.96 1.03 0.94 c,d 
AUD IND 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.14 0.09 0.17 c,d 
MERGER 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.29 0.00 0.46 c,d 
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Table 2: Continued 
a. Financial reporting aggressiveness model (equation 2).  
b. Tax avoidance model (equation 3). 
c. (d.) Investments in tax services selection model, equation 4 (outcome model, equation 
5). 
Summary statistics of variables (defined in the Appendix). I require variables for WB 
and match (non-WB) firms in t and t+1 (t = whistleblowing year). Potential differences 
in WB and non-WB observations arise from WB (non-WB) firm having more or fewer 
observations in periods before t or after t+1. For tests using ACCT RISK and AGR, the 
number of observations is 204 (201) for WB (non-WB) firms. Difference in variables 
across WB and non-WB firm are in bold.  
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Table 2: Continued 
 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (Financial Reporting Tests) 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
AQ  
                   
1 ACCT RISK -0.05  
                  
2 AGR -0.04 0.81  
                 
3 WB -0.07 0.03 0.07  
                
4 POST -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01  
               
5 WB * POST -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 0.33 0.68  
              
6 PRESS -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.01 0.09  
             
7 BIG 4 -0.09 0.03 0.06 0.10 -0.05 0.03 0.02  
            
8 ΔAUDITOR -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.01  
           
9 TENURE -0.02 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.09 -0.07 0.14 -0.38  
          
10 STD CFO 0.09 -0.03 -0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.14 0.01 -0.04  
         
11 STD SALE -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.42  
        
12 LN MVE -0.20 0.23 0.30 0.17 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.20 -0.09 0.22 -0.34 -0.25  
       
13 ROA -0.08 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.12 -0.11 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.38  
      
14 LEVERAGE 0.13 0.04 0.14 0.20 -0.01 0.05 -0.11 0.06 0.07 -0.08 0.02 0.03 -0.24 -0.32  
     
15 BTM 0.06 -0.12 -0.15 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.22 0.05 -0.14 -0.04 0.11 -0.46 -0.49 0.07  
    
16 INTANG  -0.12 0.23 0.23 0.08 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.36 -0.18 0.08 -0.05 0.13 0.08  
   
17 NO INTANG 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.19 -0.20 0.03 0.15 0.05 -0.02  
  
18 CAP INTENSITY 0.16 -0.13 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.04 0.06 0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.21 -0.02 -0.43 0.20  
 
19 RAISE CAP 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.09 -0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.22 0.14 -0.07 -0.03 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.02  
20 LOSS 0.00 -0.09 -0.17 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.20 0.12 -0.19 0.20 0.05 -0.36 -0.52 0.16 0.29 -0.17 -0.03 0.09 -0.11 
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Table 2: Continued 
Panel C: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (Tax Avoidance Tests) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 
ETR  
                 
1 CASH ETR 0.78  
                
2 WB 0.04 0.03  
               
3 POST 0.04 0.09 0.01  
              
4 WB * POST 0.05 0.08 0.33 0.68  
             
5 PRESS 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.01 0.09  
            
6 SIZE -0.12 -0.09 0.19 0.01 0.06 0.16  
           
7 ROA 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.07  
          
8 LEVERAGE -0.05 0.07 0.20 -0.01 0.05 -0.11 0.02 -0.32  
         
9 FOREIGN INC -0.08 -0.14 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.12 -0.05 -0.14  
        
10 CAP INTENSITY -0.03 0.11 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.09 -0.04 0.21 -0.43  
       
11 BIG 4 -0.07 -0.01 0.10 -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.19 0.12 0.06 -0.07 0.05  
      
12 RD -0.03 -0.14 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.01 -0.29 0.39 -0.27 -0.13  
     
13 INTANG  -0.09 -0.10 0.08 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.09 -0.05 0.13 0.17 -0.43 0.07 -0.02  
    
14 BTM -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.17 -0.49 0.07 -0.09 -0.02 -0.22 -0.15 0.08  
   
15 SALES GROWTH 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.28 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.08  
  
16 CASH 0.02 -0.07 -0.10 0.02 -0.04 0.17 -0.23 0.20 -0.44 0.15 -0.25 -0.08 0.60 -0.25 -0.06 0.05  
 
17 NOL -0.09 -0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.08 -0.29 0.07 0.28 -0.17 -0.07 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.05  
18 ΔNOL 0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.10 0.07 -0.05 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.09 
 
Significant coefficients (p-value < 0.05) are in bold. Model variables are defined in the Appendix.
 69 
 
Table 3 
Covariate Balance between Treatment (WB)  
and Control (non-WB) Groups in Match Year 
Variable 
Difference 
in Means 
Difference 
in Medians          
Difference in 
Distributions*          
 
(p-values)  (p-values)  (p-values)  
CM_PRESSURE  0.521  0.570  0.931  
GROWTH  0.786  0.780  0.688  
PAST_PERF  0.547  0.557  0.902  
REPUTATION  0.936  0.939  1.000  
COMMUNICATION 0.998  0.901  0.631  
DOWNSIZE  0.872  0.936  0.697  
QUITAM 0.650  0.651  1.000  
SIZE 0.649  0.269  0.316  
ICW 0.945  0.865  0.994  
 
Tests of differences in means (t-tests), medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests), and 
distributions (Kolmogorov-Smirnov homogenous distributions tests) of matching 
variables (following Bowen et al. 2010) in the match year (i.e., the year prior to the 
whistleblowing allegations for WB firms and for control firms, the year prior to the year 
control firm’s matched treatment firm was subject to the whistleblowing allegations).
 70 
 
Table 4 
Whistleblowing Allegations and Subsequent Financial Reporting Aggressiveness (test of H1)  
  
  Changes: Full Sample Period    Time Series  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
  
Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  
  
(p-value)  (p-value)  (p-value)  (p-value)  (p-value)  (p-value)  
 
Pred. ΔAQ Std Coef. 
ΔACCT 
RISK  Std Coef. ΔAGR 
Std 
Coef. AQ Std Coef. ACCT RISK Std Coef. AGR 
Std 
Coef. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
WB 
 
-0.002 -0.016 5.558** 0.201 0.436 0.016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(0.882)  (0.025)  (0.856)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
POST 
 
0.006 0.051 12.81** 0.463 4.094 0.153 -0.005 -0.091 -5.696** -0.236 -6.698** -0.278 
  
(0.724)  (0.016)  (0.464)  (0.249)  (0.045)  (0.015)  
WB * POST - -0.011 -0.086 -24.40*** -0.882 -12.87** -0.481 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(0.294)  (0.000)  (0.039)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESS 
 
0.016 0.131 -3.102 -0.112 -5.262 -0.197 0.015 0.266 -10.97 -0.454 -16.49* -0.685 
  
(0.140)  (0.637)  (0.243)  (0.217)  (0.147)  (0.052)  
ΔAUDITOR 
 
-0.104 -0.836 -4.032 -0.146 -11.02 -0.412 -0.042* -0.717 -15.84 -0.656 -27.82 -1.156 
  
(0.221)  (0.687)  (0.338)  (0.099)  (0.407)  (0.255)  
TENURE 
  
 
 
 
 
 0.001** 0.015 -0.212 -0.089 -0.545** -0.230 
   
 
 
 
 
 (0.024)  (0.383)  (0.020)  
ΔSTD CFO 
 
0.025 0.004 105.1* 0.083 106.5* 0.087 -0.133 -0.083 108.6 0.164 89.54* 0.136 
  
(0.915)  (0.098)  (0.093)  (0.461)  (0.136)  (0.090)  
ΔSTD SALE 
 
-0.062 -0.046 37.29** 0.130 26.37 0.095 -0.149** -0.294 56.40** 0.254 34.70** 0.157 
  
(0.353)  (0.047)  (0.154)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.050)  
ΔLN MVE 
 
-0.004 -0.015 6.582 0.106 2.168 0.036 -0.008** -0.239 5.739*** 0.421 6.861*** 0.506 
  
(0.814)  (0.226)  (0.690)  (0.013)  (0.001)  (0.000)  
ΔROA 
 
0.061 0.035 -2.083 -0.006 -6.856 -0.019 0.058 0.103 -32.72 -0.135 -10.27 -0.043 
  
(0.224)  (0.945)  (0.815)  (0.312)  (0.205)  (0.676)  
ΔLEVERAGE 
 
0.218** 0.108 40.71 0.095 39.16 0.095 0.084*** 0.250 6.066 0.042 33.36** 0.232 
  
(0.016)  (0.102)  (0.167)  (0.005)  (0.642)  (0.014)  
ΔBTM 
 
0.019 0.029 6.410 0.046 -1.588 -0.012 0.017 0.082 8.654 0.096 11.62 0.129 
  
(0.587)  (0.503)  (0.865)  (0.366)  (0.440)  (0.270)  
ΔINTANG 
 
-0.072 -0.032 119.1*** 0.238 104.2*** 0.216 -0.037* -0.119 19.36 0.147 14.68 0.112 
  
(0.345)  -0.000  (0.000)  (0.093)  (0.115)  (0.256)  
NO INTANG 
  
 
 
 
 
 0.018* 0.317 1.178 0.049 3.043 0.127 
   
 
 
 
 
 (0.068)  (0.813)  (0.561)  
ΔCAP 
INTENSITY 
 
0.069 0.018 -63.45 -0.078 -12.26 -0.016 0.036 0.097 -26.98 -0.180 -30.33* -0.203 
  
(0.738)  (0.165)  (0.772)  (0.404)  (0.135)  (0.087)  
ΔRAISE CAP 
 
0.014 0.110 12.53* 0.453 9.979 0.373 0.053 0.916 -4.359 -0.180 3.238 0.135 
  
(0.858)  (0.090)  (0.438)  (0.171)  (0.731)  (0.878)  
ΔLOSS 
 
-0.021 -0.169 9.335* 0.337 3.640 0.136 -0.020 -0.337 -3.045 -0.126 -7.159 -0.298 
  
(0.233)  (0.091)  (0.527)  (0.299)  (0.645)  (0.261)  
Constant 
 
-0.007  -3.723**  0.003  -0.043  23.61  14.22  
  
(0.503)  (0.040)  (0.999)  (0.395)  (0.232)  (0.517)  
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Table 4: Continued 
              
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
  ΔAQ  
ΔACCT 
RISK   ΔAGR  AQ  ACCT RISK  AGR  
              
Observations 
 
459   341   341   271   239   239   
Adj. R-
squared   0.004 -0.016 0.133  0.079  0.209 -0.091 0.355  0.404  
 
*, **, *** represent significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively (two-tailed tests; one-tailed tests if prediction is 
made and sign is consistent with prediction). Note that time series tests include only those firms that are subject to 
whistleblowing allegations during the sample period and the prediction applies to the coefficient on POST rather than 
WB*POST. In columns (5) and (6), the coefficient on ΔAUDITOR is omitted due to lack of variation in changes in firms’ use 
of their independent auditor. In all columns, the coefficient on ΔBig 4 is omitted due to lack of variation in use of a Big 4 
auditor among WB firms in the sample. Std Coef. columns report standardized coefficients, which reflect the standard deviation 
change in the dependent variable associated a change from 0 to 1 for binary variables and the standard deviation change in the 
dependent variable for a standard deviation change in the independent variable (for continuous variables). Variables are 
defined in the Appendix. Time series models include industry (two-digit SIC code) and year fixed effects, with standard errors 
clustered by firm (Gow et al. 2010; Petersen 2009). The changes model removes industry and year effects. However, results  
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Table 4: Continued 
 
are qualitatively similar (same sign and significance) in all tests if I include industry and year fixed effects (i.e., if I do not 
difference out the fixed effects). I winsorize continuous variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
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Table 5 
Whistleblowing Allegations and Firms’ Subsequent Tax Avoidance (test of H2) 
  
 Changes: Full Sample Period  Time Series  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
  
Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  
  
(p-value)  (p-value)  (p-value)  (p-value)  
 
Prediction ΔETR Std Coef. ΔCASH ETR Std Coef. ETR Std Coef. CASH ETR Std Coef. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WB 
 
-0.019 -0.147 -0.018 -0.117 
 
 
 
 
  
(0.125)  (0.251)  
 
 
 
 
POST 
 
-0.011 -0.088 0.005 0.035 0.035* 0.192 0.043** 0.219 
  
(0.603)  (0.797)  (0.064)  (0.049)  
WB * POST + 0.051** 0.398 0.063** 0.422 
 
 
 
 
  
(0.039)  (0.018)  
 
 
 
 
PRESS 
 
-0.020 -0.161 -0.007 -0.046 0.054 0.311 0.062 0.326 
  
(0.543)  (0.837)  (0.120)  (0.105)  
ΔSIZE 
 
0.066 0.087 0.109 0.122 -0.028 -0.254 -0.024 -0.200 
  
(0.391)  (0.127)  (0.202)  (0.237)  
ΔROA 
 
-0.070 -0.039 -0.216 -0.103 -0.165 -0.098 -0.225 -0.122 
  
(0.639)  (0.235)  (0.509)  (0.376)  
ΔLEVERAGE 
 
-0.259** -0.125 -0.409*** -0.167 0.044 0.043 -0.023 -0.021 
  
(0.012)  (0.002)  (0.724)  (0.882)  
ΔFOREIGN 
INC 
 
-0.015 -0.120 -0.025 -0.167 0.096** 0.553 0.084** 0.441 
  
(0.563)  (0.389)  (0.025)  (0.035)  
ΔCAP 
INTENSITY 
 
-0.517 -0.131 -0.574 -0.124 -0.202 -0.181 -0.082 -0.067 
  
(0.103)  (0.113)  (0.310)  (0.699)  
ΔR&D 
 
1.241 0.105 1.687 0.121 0.562 0.210 0.400 0.137 
  
(0.339)  (0.271)  (0.195)  (0.339)  
ΔINTANG 
 
-0.172 -0.076 -0.078 -0.029 -0.199 -0.211 -0.121 -0.117 
  
(0.266)  (0.675)  (0.211)  (0.479)  
ΔBTM 
 
-0.048 -0.071 -0.101** -0.127 0.003 0.005 0.045 0.065 
  
(0.275)  (0.028)  (0.971)  (0.632)  
SALES 
GROWTH 
 
0.030 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.077 0.067 -0.015 -0.012 
  
(0.687)  (0.544)  (0.640)  (0.934)  
ΔCASH 
 
-0.040 -0.019 -0.024 -0.010 -0.449** -0.362 -0.361* -0.266 
  
(0.627)  (0.785)  (0.014)  (0.068)  
NOL 
  
 
 
 -0.095*** -0.542 -0.074** -0.386 
   
 
 
 (0.003)  (0.019)  
ΔNOL 
 
-0.321* -0.083 -0.387 -0.085 0.546* 0.123 0.228 0.047 
  
(0.083)  (0.104)  (0.065)  (0.372)  
Constant 
 
-0.008  -0.013  0.626***  0.557***  
  
(0.320)  (0.287)  (0.000)  (0.002)  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations 
 
   451        451   271   271  
Adj. R-squared   0.045   0.079   0.240   0.211  
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Table 5: Continued 
*, **, *** represent significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively (two-tailed 
tests; one-tailed tests if prediction is made and sign is consistent with prediction). Note 
that time series tests include only those firms that are subject to whistleblowing 
allegations during the sample period and the prediction applies to the coefficient on 
POST rather than WB*POST. For the time series tests, the coefficient on Big 4 is omitted 
due to lack of variation in use of a Big 4 auditor among WB firms in the sample. Std 
Coef. columns report standardized coefficients, which reflect the standard deviation 
change in the dependent variable associated a change from 0 to 1 for binary variables 
and the standard deviation change in the dependent variable for a standard deviation 
change in the independent variable (for continuous variables). Variables are defined in 
the Appendix. Time series models include industry (two-digit SIC code) and year fixed 
effects, with standard errors clustered by firm (Gow et al. 2010; Petersen 2009). The 
changes model removes industry and year effects. However, results are qualitatively 
similar (same sign and significance) in all tests if I include industry and year fixed 
effects (i.e., if I do not difference out the fixed effects). I winsorize continuous variables 
at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
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Table 6 
First-stage Selection Model (Probability of Engaging Auditor for Tax Services): 
Whistleblowing Allegations and Firms’ Subsequent Investments in Tax  Services  
 
 
PROBIT 
 TAXAUD 
 
Coefficient   (p-value) 
WB -0.071 (0.568) 
POST -0.102 (0.165) 
WB * POST 0.109 (0.216) 
PRESS 0.150 (0.275) 
INST OWN 0.243** (0.029) 
AUD IND -0.079 (0.511) 
TENURE 0.234 (0.111) 
ΔAUDITOR -0.043 (0.488) 
LN AUDIT FEES 0.361* (0.066) 
BIG 4 -0.036 (0.729) 
MERGER 0.026 (0.796) 
AQ -0.225 (0.683) 
SIZE 0.140 (0.415) 
ROA -0.045 (0.731) 
LEVERAGE -0.041 (0.762) 
FOREIGN INC 0.221 (0.128) 
CAP INTENSITY -0.059 (0.693) 
R&D -0.002 (0.991) 
INTANG 0.129 (0.377) 
BTM -0.135 (0.366) 
SALES GROWTH -0.117 (0.198) 
CASH -0.193 (0.190) 
NOL 0.033 (0.770) 
ΔNOL -0.099 (0.336) 
Constant 0.108 (0.941) 
   
Observations   542 
 Area under ROC Curve 0.833 
 Hosmer and Lemeshow  0.162 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.271   
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Table 6: Continued 
*, **, *** represent significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively (two-tailed 
tests). Variables are defined in the Appendix. All models include industry (two-digit SIC 
code) and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by firm (Gow et al. 2010; 
Petersen 2009). I winsorize continuous variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. Model 
variables are standardized (scaled by their standard deviations) for presentation (i.e., 
unstandardized variables have multiple leading zeroes right of the decimal). 
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Table 7 
Outcome Model (test of H3):  
Whistleblowing Allegations and Firms’ Subsequent Investments in Tax Services  
 
OLS 
 TAX FEES 
 
Coefficient   (p-value) 
   
 WB -0.091 (0.425) 
POST 0.059 (0.142) 
WB * POST -0.089** (0.037) 
PRESS -0.056 (0.576) 
INST OWN 0.127 (0.217) 
BIG 4 0.071 (0.141) 
MERGER 0.021 (0.789) 
AQ 0.201 (0.513) 
SIZE -0.151 (0.159) 
ROA 0.251** (0.026) 
LEVERAGE 0.147 (0.261) 
FOREIGN INC 0.336*** (0.004) 
CAP INTENSITY 0.042 (0.685) 
R&D 0.060 (0.736) 
INTANG 0.149 (0.412) 
BTM -0.017 (0.854) 
SALES GROWTH -0.183** (0.012) 
CASH -0.118 (0.416) 
NOL 0.104 (0.264) 
ΔNOL 0.066 (0.211) 
Constant -0.593 (0.518) 
INV MILLS 0.669 (0.138) 
   
Observations   356 
 Adjusted R-
squared 0.326   
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Table 7: Continued 
*, **, *** represent significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively (two-tailed 
tests). Variables are defined in the Appendix. All models include industry (two-digit SIC 
code) and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by firm (Gow et al. 2010; 
Petersen 2009). I winsorize continuous variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. Model 
variables are standardized (scaled by their standard deviations) for presentation (i.e., 
unstandardized variables have multiple leading zeroes right of the decimal). The results 
are qualitatively similar (coefficient on WB*POST is negative and significant, p < 0.05) 
using unstandardized variables.   
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Table 8 
Financial Reporting: Difference-in-difference Estimates Limited to Periods t to t+1 
    (1) (2) (3) 
  
Coef Coef Coef 
  
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
 
Prediction ΔAQ ΔACCT RISK  ΔAGR 
         
WB - 0.009 -16.59*** -9.531* 
  
(0.529) (0.005) (0.082) 
PRESS 
 
0.004 1.206 -4.983 
  
(0.911) (0.930) (0.697) 
SALES GROWTH 
 
-0.016 -2.965 -1.196 
  
(0.784) (0.906) (0.964) 
ΔSTD CFO 
 
-0.306 196.4 63.22 
  
(0.521) (0.113) (0.656) 
ΔSTD SALE 
 
-0.076 2.290 -9.455 
  
(0.315) (0.932) (0.779) 
ΔLN MVE 
 
0.057* 25.22*** 17.36* 
  
(0.051) (0.001) (0.069) 
ΔROA 
 
0.098 -82.40** -33.78 
  
(0.413) (0.034) (0.432) 
ΔLEVERAGE 
 
0.422*** 55.74 82.65* 
  
(0.002) (0.259) (0.078) 
ΔBTM 
 
0.079* 44.70** 35.81* 
  
(0.088) (0.014) (0.054) 
ΔINTANG 
 
0.026 111.1* 63.83 
  
(0.846) (0.064) (0.296) 
ΔCAP INTENSITY 
 
-0.086 113.2 181.2* 
  
(0.673) (0.214) (0.057) 
ΔRAISE CAP 
 
0.077*** -31.11*** -29.30* 
  
(0.001) (0.003) (0.054) 
ΔLOSS 
 
-0.022 3.115 5.720 
  
(0.463) (0.844) (0.639) 
Constant 
 
-0.011 5.471 0.302 
  
(0.292) (0.229) (0.950) 
   
Observations 
 
81 81 81 
Adj. R-squared  0.162 0.207 0.078 
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Table 8: Continued 
*, **, *** represent significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively (two-tailed 
tests; one-tailed tests if prediction is made and sign is consistent with prediction). 
Financial reporting responses to employee whistleblowing allegations—results of tests 
of difference-in-difference estimates for periods t to t+1, exclusively. Variables are 
defined in the Appendix. The changes model removes industry and year effects. I 
winsorize continuous variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
